DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1984
The eighteenth year of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) t
witnessed a continuation of the trend toward restricting public access to
government information. 2 Congress amended the National Security Act
of 1947, 3 exempting entire systems of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
files from search and review and declaring that the Privacy Act 4 is not an
exemption 3 statute. 5 Congress again considered, but failed to pass, a bill
to reform the FOIA; this proposal 6 would have substantially altered fees
and waivers, 7 time limits for responding to requests,8 business
confidentiality procedures, 9 and law enforcement exemptions.10 In
addition, bills were introduced in both houses to create an exemption 3
statute to protect information concerning corporate research and

development projects reported by business entities."1 But Congress also
considered a bill that would have made it more difficult for the executive
branch to classify documents and protect them from disclosure. 12
In several instances, administrative agencies took actions which
altered the operation of the FOIA. In order to protect valuable business
information from disclosure and to make it more difficult for a requester
to obtain information from an agency without bearing the cost of the

search, 13 the Department of Justice (DOJ) revised its guidelines for

14
responding to requests made under the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) issued new

1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act - 1983, 1984 DUKE L.J.
377 [hereinafter cited as Note, Developments-1983]. For a discussion of developments under the
FOIA in prior years, see the annual FOIA note in the Duke Law Journal from 1970 to 1983.
3. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
5. Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984).
See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
6. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S1794-97 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
7. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
11. H.R. 5041, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1339 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984) and S.
1841, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
12. S. 1335, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7161-65 (daily ed. May 19, 1983). See
infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
14. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,248 (1984) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 0, 16, 50).
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guidelines involving public disclosure of product information.' 5 The
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is responsible for
developing the guidelines that agencies use in implementing the Privacy
Act, declared that the Privacy Act is an exemption 3 statute under the
FOIA, although this action was later invalidated by Congress. 16
With one exception, judicial interpretation of the FOIA came
exclusively from the lower federal courts in 1984. In its single FOIA
decision of the year, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
exemption 5 incorporates the well-established discovery privilege that
applies to confidential statements made to air crash safety investigators,
and implied that the exemption applies to any civil discovery privilege
that is equally well-settled; thus the FOIA may not be used in such cases
as an additional discovery weapon in litigation against an agency. 17 The
Court refused to accept the contention that the discovery privileges
specifically mentioned in the legislative history of the FOIA exhausted
the scope of the exemption 5 protection, concluding that the examples
given were intended merely as "rough analogies."' 8
Discovery was also the subject of a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court held that a defendant
agency can engage in discovery against a FOIA plaintiff.1 9 The D.C.
Circuit also considered exemption 5, concluding that Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA) budget
recommendations
were
"predecisional" and therefore subject to withholding under the
20
exemption.
In other judicial proceedings, the Eighth, 2 ' and Tenth Circuits,22
and a district court in the Ninth Circuit, 23 addressed but failed to resolve
a split concerning the standard of "confidentiality" under exemption 7.24
The DOJ rendered moot another circuit split, and a case pending before
the Supreme Court, concerning the status of certain hybrid recordsthose created by an agency not subject to the FOIA but held by an
15. Information Disclosure Under Section 6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 16 C.F.RY.
pt. 1101 (1985). See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
16. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338 (1984). See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
17. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1488, 1494 (1984). See infra notes 167-83
and accompanying text.
18. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1488, 1494 & n.22 (1984).
19. Weisberg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra notes 322-35 and
accompanying text.
20. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v. United States Dep't of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1498 (D.C. Cir.
1984). See infra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
21. See Parton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 727 F.2d 774, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1984).
22. See Johnson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1984).
23. See Powell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 584 F. Supp. 1508, 1528-30 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
24. See infra notes 195-231 and accompanying text.
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agency subject to it-by conceding that presentence reports compiled by
a federal district court probation officer and delivered to the United State
Parole Commission were "agency records," and thus subject to the
disclosure provisions of the FOIA.2 5 The definition of "agency records"
was also litigated before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which held that personal papers such as appointment
calendars, telephone logs, and daily agendas could under certain
26
circumstances be subject to the FOIA's disclosure provisions.
Finally, a number of circuits addressed the proper scope of judicial
review of agency withholding decisions. The Fifth 27 and Ninth
Circuits28 held that standards of review in the tax code do not displace
the more stringent FOIA requirement of de novo federal court review of
29
a withholding when the material withheld concerns a taxpayer's return,
and that the FOIA's disclosure rules are not preempted by the ERTA
amendment to the tax code. In another matter, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals30 upheld Congress's broad grant of discretion
to the district court in deciding whether to conduct in camera review of
materials withheld under exemption 5.
I.
A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Freedom of Information Reform Bill.

Nonjudicial developments in the FOIA during 1984 were overshadowed by the potential legislative developments that were proposed but
not enacted; these were embodied in a controversial Senate bill that Congress failed to pass. Entitled the Freedom of Information Reform Act
(the Reform Bill), the bill proposed significant amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, 3 1 and marked the first time in a decade that the
Senate has acted to substantially reform the FOIA. 32 The Reform Bill
was the product of an extended effort by Senator Orrin Hatch to alter the
25. See Brief for Respondent at 7, Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 317
(1984). See infra notes 72-136 and accompanying text.
26. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v. United States Dep't of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1494-96 (D.C. Cir.
1984). See infra notes 255-80 and accompanying text.
27. Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d 998, 1003 (5th Cir. 1984).
28. Long v. IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1984).
29. See infra notes 281-307 and accompanying text.
30. Center for Auto Safety v. EPA, 731 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra notes 308-21 and
accompanying text.
31. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S1794-97 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
32. Rothman, Freedom of Information Act Changes Approved by Senate, CONG. Q., Mar. 3,
1984, at 511.
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FOIA. 33 The House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture, chaired by Representative Glenn English, conducted hearings on the proposed bill in the summer of 1984, after it had
34
been approved by a voice vote in the Senate.
The hearings did not evidence overwhelming support for the Reform Bill; many groups testified against the proposed changes. 35 Indeed,
Chairman English appeared unconvinced that such major changes were
37
needed. 36 Criticism was focused on four major areas: fees and waivers,
time limits for responding to a request, 38 business confidentiality proce4°
dures, 39 and law enforcement exemptions.
1. Fees and Waivers. Subsection (a)(4)(A) of the FOIA 4 1 regulates fees that an agency can charge requesters for information. The provision allows an agency to recover only the "direct costs" of a search plus
charges for duplication. Agencies are given the discretion to waive or
reduce the fee if the information furnished would primarily benefit the
42
general public.
Section 2 of the Reform Bill would amend subsection (a)(4)(A) to
charge a "fair value fee" for requests "containing commercially valuable
technological information which was generated or procured by the Gov33. See Note, Developments-1983, supra note 2; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1982, 1983 DUKE L.J. 390; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1981, 1982 DUKE L.J. 423.
34. Senate Approves Comprehensive FOIA Legislation, 10 ACCESS REP. No. 5, Feb. 29, 1984, at
1; 130 CONG. REc. S1822 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
35. Those testifying at the hearing included various media groups, such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Society of Professional Journalists (Sigma Delta Chi), the Newsletter Association, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, and the Information Industry
Association; the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); the American Bar Association (ABA);
the Department of Justice (DOJ); and concerned historians.
36. The Freedom of Information Reform Act. Hearingson S. 774 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't
Information, Justice, and Agricultureof the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,98th Cong., 2d Sess.
31 (1984) (opening statement of Rep. English, Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
37. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982).
42. The subsection provides:
In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt of public comment, specifying a uniform schedule of
fees applicable to all constituent units of such agency. Such fees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for document search and duplication and provide for recovery of
only the direct costs of such search and duplication. Documents shall be furnished without
charge or at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver or reduction of the
fee is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982).
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ernment at substantial cost to the public, is likely to be used for a commercial purpose, and will deprive the Government of its commercial
value."' 43 The qualifying phrase "benefitting. . . not the commercial or
private interest of the requester" would be added to the clause of subsec-

tion (a)(4)(A) that allows fees to be waived when the information disclosed is in the public interest.44 According to the Senate Committee
report, the purpose of these proposals was to prevent "an unjustifiable
windfall" to a few at the expense of the public. 4 5 The Committee illustrated the type of windfall the amendments were designed to prevent by

referring to an instance in which a Japanese company acquired sophisticated water desalination technology for a fraction of the sum the govern-

ment had spent developing

it.46

The Senate Committee maintained that the fair value fee was consistent with the Federal User Fee Statute, which requires a federal agency

to generate enough revenue to pay for anything of value prepared or issued by the agency47 by requiring a fair and equitable payment from par-

ties requesting information with particular economic value. 48 At the
hearings, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued in opposi-

tion to the bill that Congress was fully aware of the Federal User Fee
Statute when it amended the FOIA in 1974, and that it made a conscious

choice not to charge a "fair value fee" for requests. 49 Other opponents
charged that the Reform Bill would displace certain provisions in the

Copyright Act.5 0

43. S. 774, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1, 130 CoNG. REc. S1794-95 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
44. Id.
45. S. RaP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 221].
46. Id.
47. 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982). Courts have defined the limits of the statute by prescribing the
factors to be considered in measuring fees. In Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co.,
415 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974), the Supreme Court interpreted 31 U.S.C. § 483a, the predecessor of the
current statute, to authorize a fee only if the recipient derived a specific benefit- one that did not
primarily benefit the general public. In National Cable Television Assoc. v. United States, 415 U.S.
336, 342-43 (1974), the Court found that the same statute required that fees be based on the value
received by the recipient of government services. Moreover, the fee charged must bear a reasonable
relationship to the actual costs borne by the agency in rendering the service, National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1094, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1976), including both direct and indirect costs,
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 601 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1979).
48. S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 8.
49. Hearings,supra note 36, at 918 (testimony of Allan R. Adler, ACLU). The ACLU also
argued that when the FOIA was amended in 1974, the House and Senate conferees adopted almost
verbatim the Senate fee provision that made explicit reference to the User Fee Statute and they
concluded that "it is not necessary that FOIA services performed by agencies be self-sustaining." Id.
(citing S. RPp. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1974)).
50. Hearings, supra note 36, at 482 (testimony of Paul G. Zurkowski, Information Industry
Association); id. at 918 (testimony of Allan R. Adler, ACLU); see also Letter from David Ladd,
Register of Copyrights, to Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (Oct. 11, 1983), 130 CONG. REc. E65758 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1984) (expressing concern of Copyright Office over conflict between fee provi-
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Media interests expressed concern about the vague language of the
subsection, pointing to the ambiguity of such phrases as "technological
information" and "commercially valuable." 5 1 Such language, they argued, would be particularly susceptible to misinterpretation by agencies,
a circumstance which could lead to an increase in request denials and a
52
decrease in access to certain information.
Opponents also argued that limiting waivers of fees 53 to those situations in which information would not be put to "commercial use" would
penalize the book and newspaper publishing industries. 54 The Senate
Committee report responds directly to this concern, however, by stating
that "commercial use" does not encompass the news media even though
they operate for profit.55 The report indicates, moreover, that if a commercial use is not established and the requester is a scholar, a scientist, a

representative of the news media, or a member of a non-profit group intending to make the information available to the general public, the fee is
56
to be completely waived.
The first section of the Reform Bill would further amend subsection
(a)(4)(A) to require that fee schedules provide for the payment of "all
costs reasonably and directly attributable to responding to the request,
which shall include reasonable standard charges for the cost of services

by agency personnel in search, duplication, and other processing of the
request."'57 The FOIA currently does not allow an agency to charge for
the cost of "processing" a request.5 8 The cost of implementing the Freesions of Reform Act and copyright law). The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1976), provides:
"Copyright protection. . . is not available for any work of the United States Government."
51. Hearings,supra note 36, at 128 (testimony of Reg Murphy, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press); id. at 937 (testimony of Allan R. Adler, ACLU).
52. Media concerns argued, for example, that it was unclear whether the exemption allowing
the imposition of fees would apply to "technological" studies done by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development on the best method of suburban zoning. Id. at 127 (testimony of Reg
Murphy, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).
53. According to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A), a fee is waived if the government determines that
such a waiver is "in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as
primarily benefitting the general public." The Reform Bill would exempt particular instancescommercial use-from the broad "public interest" fee-waiving standard. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2, 130 CONG. REc. S1794 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
54. Hearings,supra note 36, at 132 (testimony of Reg Murphy, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).
55. S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 11.
56. Id. at 10.
57. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 130 CONG. REc. S1794 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). The
FOIA currently allows for the "recovery of only the direct costs" of document search and duplication. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982).
58. The FOIA levies a charge for the direct costs incurred. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (A)(1982).
Processing costs are the "costs of reviewing responsive records to determine what material should be
" S. REP. 221, supra note 45,
released to the requester and what material should be withheld ....

748
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dom of Information Act has long concerned a number of governmental
authorities. One study indicates that FOIA compliance cost the govern-

ment $47.8 million in 1979, while total FOIA revenues-fees paid by the
requesters- covered approximately four percent of the direct costs of
compliance.59 The Senate Committee report notes that the number of
FOIA requests and the attendant costs far exceed those anticipated by

Congress in 1974 when it considered and rejected an amendment to permit recovery of review costs. 6°
Those testifying at the hearings pointed out that the Reform Bill

61
failed to suggest any criteria for assessing the legitimate costs of review.
The ACLU attributed this lack of criteria to "Congress's continued fail-

ure to grapple with an administrative process which varies widely from
agency to agency, [and which] has repeatedly been shown. . . to be rife
with redundancy, irrelevancy and other attributes of bureaucratic ineffi-

ciency." 62 It was noted that some agencies charge for copying, but not
for search

CoStS, 6 3

the rate charged for copying varies widely, 64 and those

agencies that do charge for search time often use a flat rate regardless of
the pay scale of the employee conducting the search. 65
2. Time Limits. The FOIA allows an agency ten working days to
respond to a request for information, and twenty working days to process

an appeal of a denial of a request. 66 In the event of "unusual circumstances," the agency is permitted to extend these limits ten working
at 7. The Senate Committee was careful to point out that processing does not involve the policy and
legal decisions agency personnel must make in deciding whether to release information, but does
include a review of the record in question to determine whether withholding or deletions are necessitated by law or by governmental policy. Id.
59. Freedom ofInformation Act Oversight: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Gov't Information
and IndividualRights of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1981)
(testimony of Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General).
60. S.REP. 221, supra note 45, at 7.
61. Hearings, supra note 36, at 917 (testimony of Allan R. Adler, ACLU).
62. Id. The ACLU suggests that Congress study the administrative process of the FOIA to
develop specific criteria for assessing legitimate review costs. Id.
63. Hearings,supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association, at 11). An example of the use of this practice is the Selective Service System,
32 C.F.R. § 1662.6 (1982).
64. Hearings,supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association, at 11). Compare the rates of the Department of Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 286.61
(1984) ($0.01) and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 2201.5
(1984) ($0.10) with the Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 7.95 (1984) ($0.25 for first page,
$0.05 thereafter) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 44 C.F.R. § 5.46 (1984) ($2.00
for first six pages).
65. Hearings,supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association, at 11). See, eg., Department of Commerce, 15 C.F.R. § 4.9 (1985) ($10.00 per
hour); Department of Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. § 5.61(a)(1984) ($10.00 per hour).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii) (1982).
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days. 6 7 If the agency fails to meet these deadlines, the requester "shall be
deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies." '6 8 The Reform
Bill proposes an extension of up to thirty working days for an initial
request or appeal if there are "unusual circumstances," and an extension
69
of up to sixty working days if the circumstances are "exceptional.
In addition, section two of the Reform Bill provides three new examples of "unusual circumstances" to add to the three already described
in subsection (a)(6)(B)(i)-(iii). 70 All deadline extensions would be restricted to these six specifically defined situations. 7 ' Those testifying

against the Reform Bill felt that more definitions of "unusual circumstances" would simply create more situations in which a request for in-

formation could be denied, forcing requesters to seek relief in the
courts.

72

67. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B) (1982). This section provides, in part:
As used in this subparagraph, "unusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular request(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other
establishments that are separate from the office processing the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of
separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed,
with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or
among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter interest
therein.
Id.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(C) (1982). This subsection, however, is not absolute in this regard.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text. "If the Government can show exceptional circumstances
exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may
retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the records." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1982).
69. S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 12-13. Those testifying noted, however, that these time limits
have been rendered virtually meaningless by a judicial interpretation that allows indefinite extensions
as long as the agency can demonstrate that it is processing requests with "due diligence." Hearings,
supra note 36, at 129 (testimony of Reg Murphy, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press);
id. at 100 (testimony of Michael W. Hammer, Society of Professional Journalists). The concern was
best expressed by Jerry W. Friedheim of the American Newspaper Publishers Association: "If the
current 10-day limit can become 18 months at the FBI and two years at the State Department, what
would a 60-day limit become?" Id. at 86 (testimony of Jerry W. Friedheim, American Newspaper
Publishers Association).
70. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 130 CONG. REC. S1795 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). The
Reform Bill would add the following to the list of "unusual circumstances" set out supra at note 67:
(iv) a request which the head of the agency has specifically stated in writing cannot be
processed within the time limits stated in paragraph (6)(A) without significantly obstructing or impairing the timely performance of a statutory agency function;
(v) the need for notification of submitters of information and for consideration of any objections to disclosure made by such submitters; or
(vi) an unusually large volume of requests or appeals at an agency, creating a substantial
backlog.
71. S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 13.
72. Hearings,supra note 36, at 129 (testimony of Reg Murphy, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).
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Business Confidentiality Procedure. The third section of the

Reform Bill would amend subsection 552(a) of the FOIA to "require
agencies to promulgate regulations specifying procedures that would per-

mit submitters of trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
information to present claims of confidentiality to an agency before submitted information is released in response to an FOIA request. '73 Devel-

oped in response to a judicial determination that the FOIA created no
private right of action that a submitter of information might use against

an agency to enjoin disclosure, 74 this provision is the only section of the
75
Reform Bill that did not meet substantial opposition.

4. Law Enforcement Exemptions. In order to protect confidential
sources, the eighth section of the Reform Bill would exempt from disclo-

sure files and information concerning personal or medical matters. The
Reform Bill would exempt information from disclosure when such disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute" 76 an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, thus replacing the present standard of

whether disclosure "would constitute" such an invasion.77
This modification has been criticized as unnecessary in light of the
existing judicial interpretation of exemption 6.78 In Department of State
v. Washington Post Co., 79 the Supreme Court reversed a line of cases that
had interpreted the phrase "personal, medical and similar files" in "an
73. S.REP. 221, supra note 45, at 14.
74. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979); see Note, Developments-1983, supra
note 2, at 379-80 (discussing Chrysler). The only recourse currently available if the submitter opposes FOIA disclosure of information is an action under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. That section provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. . . is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1982). This remedy is available, however, only after the improper disclosure has been made;
often an award of damages may not compensate the submitter for the loss.
75. Hearings, supra note 36, at 689 (opening statement of Rep. English, Chairman).
76. S.774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9, 130 CONG. REC. S1796 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). The
language of the Reform Bill is much broader than the present statute, and would allow an agency to
withhold records where there is a reasonable possibility of an invasion of privacy. The FOIA employs a much stricter standard, requiring a showing that the release of the information would actually constitute an invasion of privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
77. Exemption 6 of the current FOIA exempts "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6) (1982).
78. Hearings,supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association, at 23) (citing Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976) (law
review editor may have access to summaries of honor and ethics hearings at a school, but identity of
individuals involved must be withheld)). The Bar Association Committee felt that this case exemplified the courts' ability to strike a proper balance between the right to access and the right to
privacy under the present standard.
79. 456 U.S. 595, 601-02 (1982) (protection for personal information is not lost merely because
it is stored in file labeled other than "personnel" or "medical").
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overly formalistic way." 80 The Senate Committee was aware of the
Supreme Court's decision in Washington Post, and was attempting in the
Reform Bill to codify the Court's holding. 81 Critics of the provision tes-

tified that because courts are already aware of the need to protect confidential sources, 82 any apparent weakening of the standard would further
83
encourage the denial of information requests.

The tenth section of the Reform Act would alter the standard for
assessing the risks of disclosure of law enforcement records. 84 According
to the testimony of William H. Webster, Director of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), the current provision-subsection (b)(7)-could
allow "clever requesters" to use the FOIA to identify confidential
sources.8 5 "Seemingly innocuous details in FBI records might provide
the missing clue to identify a source or at least narrow down the candidates. A criminal does not require proof positive before taking action on
such information. ' 86 Criticism of this change was focused on the failure
of the FBI to cite any specific instance in which the old standard had
80. See S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 22 (evaluating the impact of Washington Post).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Agee v. CIA, 517 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (D.D.C. 1981) (finding that National Security Act of 1947 and Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 prevent release to former CIA official of
all CIA files and records pertaining to him).
83. Hearings,supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association, at 23-24).
84. Section 10 of the Reform Bill provides:
(a) Section 552(b)(7) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonablybe expected to
disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis,
and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority
in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation information furnished by a confidential source, (E)
would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if
such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could
reasonablybe expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any natural person ....
"
S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10, 130 CONG. REc. S 1796 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (emphasis added).
At each point where the language "could reasonably be expected to" was added, the original language required a showing that harm would actually result.
85. Hearings,supra note 36, at 811 (testimony of William H. Webster, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
86. Id. The concerns of the FBI are echoed in Executive Order 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 app. at 67 (West Supp. 1985) which provides that a document should
be classified under exemption 1 when "its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context
of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security." Exec.
Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 169 (1983) app. at 67, reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West
Supp. 1985). Under this "mosaic theory," agencies can classify information which, by itself, poses
no threat to national security, but which has a potential for causing harm if combined with more
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actually proven inadequate.8 7 Critics also predicted that a flood of8litiga8

tion and implementation problems would accompany the change.
In addition, the Reform Bill proposes to add a new provision to

section 552 exempting files pertaining to organized crime, as designated
by the Attorney General, for not less than five years, but up to a maxi-

mum of eight years where there is an overriding public interest in providing longer exemption.

9

After this period, the information could still be

subject to any of the subsection (b) exemptions and could therefore remain undisclosed. 90 The Senate committee that approved this provision
noted that the FOIA is systematically exploited by organized crime; such
requesters seek to ascertain whether they are the targets of an investigation. 91 Although the public record fails to substantiate this claim, the

committee stated that its position was supported by evidence that it had
examined, in camera, in a special session. 92 Those testifying in opposi-

tion to the provision,
although commending the well-drafted definition of
' 93
"organized crime,"

objected to the committee's use of in camera evi-

information from the same document or others. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act - 1982, 1983 DUKE L.J. 390, 395-98 (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,356).
87. Hearings,supra note 36, at 102 (testimony of Michael W. Hammer, Society of Professional
Journalists); id. at 54 (testimony of Edward Cony, American Society of Newspaper Editors); id.
(testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York City Bar Association, at 27). Critics
of the Reform Bill testified that under the present standard the courts were adequately protecting the
Bureau's legitimate concerns. See, e.g., id.
88. Id. at 102 (testimony of Michael W. Hammer, Society of Professional Journalists). The
"could reasonably be expected to" language is more ambiguous; as a result, courts may find the new
standard more difficult to apply.
89. Section 14(c) of the Reform Bill provides:
Nothing in this section shall be deemed applicable to documents compiled in any lawful
investigation of organized crime, designated by the Attorney General for the purposes of
this subsection and conducted by a criminal law enforcement authority for law enforcement purposes, if the requested document was first generated or acquired by such law
enforcement authority within five years of the date of the request, except where the agency
determines pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Attorney General that there is an
overriding public interest in earlier disclosure or in longer exclusion not to exceed three
years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no document described in the preceding sentence may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of until the document is available for
disclosure in accordance with subsections (a) and (b) of this section for a period of not less
than ten years.
S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(c), 130 CONG. REC. S1796 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
90. S.REP. 221, supra note 45, at 31.
91. Id. at 30.
92. See id.
93. Hearings. supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association, at 36). The Reform Act defines "organized crime" as
those structured and disciplined associations of individuals or of groups of individuals who
are associated for the purpose of obtaining monetary or commercial gains or profits, wholly
or in part by illegal means, while generally seeking to protect and promote their activities
through a pattern of graft or corruption, and whose associations generally exhibit the following characteristics:
(A) their illegal activities are conspiratorial,
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dence, 94 and argued that a new exemption would be superfluous in light
95
of the existing protections of exemption (b)(7).

The ninety-eighth session of Congress failed to reach a consensus on

the Reform Bill. 96 For this reason, the bill is now technically "dead" and
any new FOIA reform legislation will have to be proposed in the ninety98
ninth session. 9 7 Groundbreaking has already begun.
(B) in at least part of their activities, they commit acts of violence or other acts which
are likely to intimidate,
(C) they conduct their activities in a methodical or systematic and in a secret fashion,
(D) they insulate their leadership from direct involvement in illegal activities by their
organizational structure,
(E) they attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through
corruption, graft, and illegitimate means, and
(F) they engage in patently illegal enterprises such as dealing in drugs, gambling, loansharking, labor racketeering, or the investment of illegally obtained funds in legitimate
businesses.
S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(f)(6), 130 CONG. RIc. S1797 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
94. Hearings,supra note 36 (testimony of the Committee on Federal Legislation, New York
City Bar Association at 36).
95. Id. at 943 (testimony of Allan R. Adler, ACLU); id. at 58 (testimony of Edward Cony,
American Society of Newspaper Editors).
96. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1984, at A20, col. 5. Representative English blamed the bill's death
on the failure of the Justice Department to testify in June as scheduled. English suggested that the
resultant two-month delay by the Department drastically reduced the time available for negotiation
on the bill. Washington Focus, 10 AccEss REP. No. 19, Sept. 26, 1984, at 1.
97. S. 774 and H.R. 6414, discussed infra, note 98, are the latest efforts in a long series of
attempts to amend the FOIA. For example, the 97th Congress considered six bills to amend the
FOIA; because no action was taken, three more bills, including S. 774, were introduced in the 98th
Congress. S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 3-5.
98. On October 5, 1984, H.R. 6414, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 11,363 (1984) was
introduced by Representative English. The bill establishes a three-tiered fee structure for (a) commercial requesters, (b) scholars, scientists, the media, non-profit groups, and (c) all others. Fee
waivers are appropriate if disclosure is both likely to contribute to the public understanding of the
operations or activities of government and not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.
Indigents who show a compelling need for the information may also receive a waiver, and courts are
authorized to conduct de novo review of the denial of a fee waiver by an agency.
The bill further provides for expedited access to disclosure in the case of compelling need, and
would require the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board to initiate a proceeding to'
determine if an agency employee has acted arbitrarily and capriciously with respect to the handling
of a FOIA request. A court's written finding of suspicious circumstances would trigger the process,
and counsel's findings would be reported to the employee, the court, the requester, and Congress.
The English bill also requires that more detailed information be provided in the agencies' FOIA
reports to Congress. Agencies must publish a complete list of statutes that the agency head or
general counsel has determined are exemption 3 statutes, as well as a specific description of the scope
of the information covered.
Finally, the bill exempts from disclosure records kept by the Justice Department under an informant's name or personal identifier in response to a third party request using that name or personal identifier, except where the Department has acknowledged informant status. English
Introduces FOIA Bill in Last Days of Session, 10 ACCEss REP. No. 20, Oct. 10, 1984, at 2-4.
Representative English describes the bill as a "starting place" for next year's discussion, admitting that it is not endorsed by any of the groups with which he spent months negotiating. Id. at 2.
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NationalSecurity Act Amendments.

On September 28, 1984, Congress amended the National Security
Act, 99 which governs public disclosure of information held by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The impetus for this legislation came
from the existence of a two- to three-year backlog of FOIA requests at
the CIA, a backlog that had resulted from the requirement that all pertinent records be searched and reviewed in order to determine whether
"any reasonably segregable portion of a record" was exempt. 1" ° In the
event a withholding was challenged in court, the CIA had to provide a
written explanation for every paragraph withheld.101 Moreover, the CIA
has complained that, notwithstanding the FOIA subsection (b)(6) exemption for classified information, the risk to intelligence sources is so
great that many of these sources had stopped providing intelligence to
the agency out of fear that they would be exposed under the requirements of the FOIA.102
The Senate bill, S. 1324, which was approved by the full Senate in
1983,103 addressed these concerns by completely exempting certain files,
designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, that are in the possession of one of the three branches of the CIA. 10 4 Only files dealing with
the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations,
background investigations of informants, liaison agreements with other
governments, and scientific and technical means of gathering information
could be exempted.105 The Senate bill specifically prohibited the Director from exempting files in order to prevent search and review for information concerning a covert activity when the existence of the activity
had already been acknowledged by the Executive Branch, or for information that had been reviewed and relied upon by Congress or the agency in
06
an investigation into alleged illegal CIA activity.
The Senate bill would have limited judicial review of a CIA withholding decision. A reviewing court would have had jurisdiction to determine only whether the agency regulations implementing S. 1324
99. Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984)
(codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 403 (West Supp. 1985)). The National Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and detailed its operation. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).

100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
101. S. REP. 221, supra note 45, at 10.

102. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1984, at A2, col. 3.
103. See Developments-1983, supra note 2, at 385-86.
104. These three branches are the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Science and
Technology, and the Office of Security. S. 1324, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (adding § 701(a) to the
National Security Act of 1947), 129 CONG. REc. S16,742 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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conformed to the statutory criteria. 10 7 The same standard would have
applied to a complaint alleging either improper designation of the file or
improper placement of information in a properly designated file, unless
the complaint (1) made a prima facie showing that such an error had
been committed and (2) was supported by an affidavit based on personal
10 8
knowledge or "otherwise admissable evidence."
The primary difference between the unenacted Senate bill and the
House version 0 9 that ultimately became law was in these provisions outlining the standard for judicial review. Under the House bill as enacted,

judicial review is substantially identical to that authorized by section
107. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for statutory criteria. S. 1324, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(a) (adding § 701(e)(2) to the National Security Act of 1947), 129 CONG. REc. S16,743
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) states:
On complaint under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, that the Agency
has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with the regulations adopted
pursuant to subsection (d)(2), the review of the court shall be limited to determining
whether the Agency considered the criteria set forth in such regulations.
108. The bill states:
(1) On the complaint under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, that the
Agency has improperly withheld records because of improper designation of files or improper placement of records solely in designated files, the review of the district court,
notwithstanding any other provision of law shall be limited to a determination whether the
Agency regulations implementing subsection (a) conform to the statutory criteria set forth
in that subsection for designating files unless the complaint is supported by an affidavit,
based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence, which makes a prima facie
showing that(A) a specific file containing the records requested was improperly designated; or
(B) the records requested were improperly placed solely in designated files. If the
court finds a prima facie showing has been made under this subsection, it shall order the
Agency to file a sworn response, which may be fied in camera and ex parte, and the court
shall make its determination based upon these submissions and submissions by the plaintiff.
If the court finds under this subsection that the regulations of the Agency implementing
subsection (a) of this section do not conform to the statutory criteria set forth in that
subsection for designating files, or finds that the Agency has improperly designated a file or
improperly placed records solely in designated files, the court shall order the Agency to
search the particular designated fie for the requested records in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and to review such records under the exemptions
pursuant to section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code. If at any time during such proceedings the Agency agrees to search designated files for the requested records, the court
shall dismiss the cause of action based on this subsection.
(2) On complaint under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, that the
Agency has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with the regulations
adopted pursuant to subsection (d)(2), the review of the court shall be limited to determining whether the Agency considered the criteria set forth in such regulations.
S. 1324, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (adding § 701(e) to the National Security Act of 1947), 129
CONG. REc. S16742-43 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983).
While the Senate Report is silent on the meaning of "otherwise admissible evidence," the phrase
was probably used to distinguish an affidavit, as the term is used in S. 1324, from an affidavit as
commonly defined. Either personal knowledge-which is admissible in a court of law-or "information and belief"-a term of art for hearsay information which is not normally admissible-can
provide the basis of an affidavit. The new law seeks to make clear that an affidavit is sufficient for
judicial review of CIA withholdings only if based on admissible evidence, not inadmissible hearsay.
109. H.R. 5164, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1716 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1984).
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552(a)(4)(B) of the FOIA,110 except that the proceeding is conducted "ex
parte, in camera" and requires, where possible, allegations by sworn

submission. "1
Representative English attached two important amendments to the
House bill before it was reviewed in his Government Operations subcom-

mittee in July of 1984. The first amendment requires the director of the
CIA to prepare, for the first two years of the new law, an unclassified

biannual report establishing the amount of money and number of staff
the CIA has allocated to process FOIA requests, the number of requests
received and processed during the preceeding six months, an estimate of

the average amount of processing time spent, and the number of requests
110. Subsection (a)(4)(B) of the FOIA provides:
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld
from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and
may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such
records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
I11. Whenever any person who has requested agency records under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) alleges that the Central Intelligence Agency has improperly
withheld records because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial
review shall be available under the terms set forth in subparagraph 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5,
United States Code, except that(1) information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign relations which is filed
with, or produced for, the court by the Agency shall be examined ex parte, in camera by
the court;
(2) the court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine issues of fact based on
sworn submissions of the parties;
(3) when a complaint alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall
support such allegation with a sworn written submission, based upon personal knowledge
or otherwise admissible evidence;
(4)(A) when a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld
because of improper exemption of operational files, the Agency shall meet its burden under
subparagraph 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by
affidavit that exempted files likely to contain responsive records currently perform the
functions set forth in subsection (b) of this section; and
(B) in making its determination under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the court
may not order the Agency to review the content of any operational file or files unless the
complainant disputes the Agency's showing with a sworn written submission based on
personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence;
(6) if the court finds under this subsection that the Agency has improperly withheld
requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, the court
shall order the Agency to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or
files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in
accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), and
such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this section; and
(7) if at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this subsection the
Agency agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested
records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
H.R. 5164, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701(0 (1983).
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currently pending. t1 2 This amendment reflects Representative English's
concern over how the CIA will implement the bill, which significantly
13
increases the discretion delegated to the agency.
The second and more controversial amendment terminates an ongoing legal debate by declaring that the Privacy Act is not an exemption 3
statute.1 14 Representative English's amendment thus settles the longstanding controversy regarding the relation of the Privacy Act to the
FOIA. The federal courts of appeals have split on the question whether
the Privacy Act is an exemption 3 statute under the FOIA.1 1 5 The Office
112. Id. House Committee Clears Legislation Exempting CIA Operational Filesfrom FOIA, 10
AccEss REP. No. 16, Aug. 1, 1984, at 2 [hereinafter cited as CIA Bill].
113. In an interview, English remarked, "The question is how much is Congress willing to trust
[CIA Director] William Casey, whose acts in the last three years have not inspired confidence and
trust." Washington Focus, 10 ACCEss REP. No. 12, June 6, 1984, at 1. By requiring the CIA to
disclose the details of its implementation of the FOIA, English hopes to prevent the agency from
using its new discretion as a tool for curtailing access to government information. A decrease in
resources allocated to the FOIA, or a decrease in the requests processed, could indicate an abuse of
agency discretion.
114. The bill, H.R. 4696, now codified at Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2211-12 (1984), provides:
Subsection (q) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, is amended . . . by adding
(2) No agency shall rely on any exemption in this section to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions of
section 552 of this title.
Exemption 3 of the FOIA provides that the statute does not apply to matters that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave nodiscretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(1982).
This exemption, by its nature, cross-references other federal withholding statutes. Because of
the Supreme Court decision in Federal Aviation Admin. v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 256-66 (1975),
which held that the broad discretionary withholding provision of the Federal Aviation Act was
referenced by exemption 3, Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553
(1982 & Supp. 11983), in 1976. The Amendment specifies that the exemption only applies to withhold information from the public if a law establishes specific criteria for withholding or commands
the withholding of particular types of information. Examples of types of information that could be
withheld under exemption 3 are patent applications, income tax returns, and records regarding nuclear testing. GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AcTs 13, 99 (R.

Bouchard & J. Franklin ed. 1980).
If the Privacy Act were declared an exemption 3 statute, then it would protect information
within its scope from disclosure under the FOIA; entire systems of records could be withheld. For
further discussion, see infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
115. Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (Privacy Act and
FOIA provide separate access to information) and Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674
F.2d 74, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (material unavailable under Privacy Act is not per se unavailable
under FOIA) are examples of cases where courts have held that the Privacy Act is not an exemption
3 statute. Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 721 F.2d 215, 222 (7th Cir. 1983) (records exempt
from disclosure under Privacy Act exemption(j)(2) may not be disclosed under FOIA request), and
Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (Privacy Act can be used to restrict access to
records that would be available under FOIA) have held that the Privacy Act is an exemption 3
statute.
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of Management and Budget (OMB) had previously declared that the Pri-

vacy Act is an exemption 3 statute, 116 and the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari to decide the issue.' 1 7 The new amendment to the Na-

tional Security Act, however, has rendered the Supreme Court case moot
and invalidated the OMB pronouncement.
The House version of the amendment was deemed particularly ac-

ceptable because it had received the backing of both the ACLU and the
CIA.' 18 The House bill was approved in a voice vote in the Senate in the
final days of the session and became law." 19
C. Research and Development Disclosure.

A third major legislative proposal involving the FOIA was approved
on March 20, 1984, by the House Judiciary Committee.' 20 The Joint
Research and Development Act of 1984121 was proposed to encourage

businesses to engage in joint corporate research and development
projects by limiting the antitrust liability of companies that inform the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Attorney General about proposed projects.'

22

The proposed bill would require a company to give

written notification of a proposed project simultaneously to the FTC and
the Attorney General.123 Information contained in the notice submitted
to the government through this process would be absolutely protected
116. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
117. Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.) (Department of Justice
records on defendant not exempt from disclosure under subsection 0)(2) of Privacy Act, which
allows directors of law enforcement agencies to exempt systems of records), petitionfor reh g denied,
722 F.2d 36 (1983), cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706, cert. dismissed as moot, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984);
Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983) (see supra note 115), cert
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706, cert dismissed as moot, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984). The two cases had been
consolidated for appeal.
118. Id. The CIA has indicated that it is not opposed to the amendments. CIA Bill, supra note
112, at 3. Nevertheless, English's amendment was so politically controversial that it was thought
that it could disrupt the earlier agreement made by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, that the Senate would accept the House version without a conference. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984, at AI5, col. 4. This, however, was not the case, and the House
version was accepted by the Senate without a conference.
119. Washington Focus, 10 AccEss REP. No. 20, Oct. 10, 1984, at 1. The bill, with its amendments, became the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209
(1984).
120. House JudiciaryApproves New Exemption 3 FOIA Statute, 10 AccEss REP. No. 9, Apr. 25,
1984, at 7 [hereinafter cited as New FOIA Statute].
121. H.R. 5041, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4, 6, 130 CONG. REc. H1339 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984).
122. New FOIA Statute, supranote 120, at 7. Pursuant to this provision, a private plaintiff in an
antitrust suit can recover only single, not treble, damages from a company complying with the proposed law. H.R. 5041, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 130 CONG. REc. H1339 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984).
123. Id at § 6. The notification must disclose "the identities of the parties and the nature, objectives, and duration of the program." Id. Within sixty days of the receipt of this notification the
attorney general will cause an abbreviated notice of the project to appear in the FederalRegister. It
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from public disclosure. Thus the House bill, if enacted, would be an exemption 3 statute under the FOIA. 124 The committee report indicates
that this exemption was deemed necessary because the existing FOIA
exemptions are discretionary-an agency retains the discretion to disclose information lawfully protected by exemption (b)(4). 12 5 The House
126
bill removes that discretion and bars disclosure.
The Senate version,1 27 although similar to the House bill, does not

confer absolute protection from disclosure on submitted information.
Businesses submitting information to the FTC and Attorney General

may request that such information remain undisclosed, but the Commission and the Attorney General each retain the authority to disclose the

information. 128
D.

NationalSecurity Exemption.

Hearings were held in the summer of 1984 on a measure 129 that
would nullify the effects of President Reagan's Executive Order 12,356130
and restore the standard for exempting information pursuant to the

(b)(1) national security exemption to that established by President
Carter's Executive Order Number 12,065.131 The Senate bill amends exemption 1 to allow an agency to withhold classified information only if
disclosure would cause "identifiable damage to national security" and the
need to protect the information outweighs the public interest in disclois this publication that triggers the damage limitation. H.R. REP. No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1984)[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 656].
Section 4 of the bill reduces the antitrust liability of a joint research and development program
that complies with H.R. 5041 to actual-not treble-damages plus prejudgment interest from the
date of filing an action or, in certain specified circumstances, from the date of injury. Id at 5.
124. New FOIA Statute, supranote 120, at 7. See infra notes 281-307 and accompanying text for
a discussion of exemption 3.
125. H.R. REP. 656, supra note 123, at 28.
126. Id.
127. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 85330 (daily ed. May 3, 1984).
128. Id. at § 204(c).
129. S. 1335, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S7161-65 (daily ed. May 19, 1983); see
Note, Developments-1983, supra note 2, at 387.
130. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 app. at 67
(West Supp. 1985).
131. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979).
The Reagan order provides that "information. . . shall be classified when. . . its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected
to cause damage to the national security." 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983). This standard is much broader
than that of the Carter order, which exempted information if its release "reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security." 3 C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979). The
Reagan standard classifies as exempt information that is harmless in itself, but has the potential to be
harmful in conjunction with other information.
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sure. 132 Senator David Durenburger, the author of the bill, told the com-

mittee the bill would send a clear signal to federal agencies that

' 33
"Congress meant it [broad disclosure] when it passed FOIA."'
The bill has received mixed reviews. Mary C. Lawton of the Justice
Department testified that the Department considers the Senate bill unconstitutional as a usurpation of the President's power as Chief Executive to protect state secrets involving national defense and foreign
policy. 13 4 Mark Lynch of the ACLU called the Justice Department's
argument a "big bluff" and urged passage of the measure. 35 Steve Garfinkel, director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), supported the Reagan version because the term "identifiable" was
ambiguous and the balancing test invited misapplication of the standard
1 36
in litigation.

II.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A number of administrative agencies promulgated rules in 1984 im-

plementing various provisions of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. 137 In general, these new procedures make access to agency
information more difficult and more expensive for the requester.
A. Department of Justice.
In March of 1984, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued new
guidelines governing the administration of the FOIA and the Privacy

Act.

38

Although many of the new guidelines are almost identical to ear-

132. S. 1335, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3 (1983).
133. Senate PanelHears Testimony of FOA Exemption I Amendment, 10 AccEss REP. No. 8,
Apr. 11, 1984, at 3.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2-3. Garfinkel noted that for 1983, the first full year following the effective date of
President Reagan's order, the number of original classification decisions decreased by two hundred
thousand, or 18%. Id. at 3. This figure was apparently used by the administration to establish that
the ISOO spent less time determining whether information fell within the scope of the standard, thus
demonstrating that the Reagan standard was clearer than that advanced by President Carter.
137. In addition to the administrative activity reported here, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated their own final rules. The
FCC has changed the standard required to gain confidential status for documents submitted to the
Commission. Previously, "clear and convincing" evidence was required to establish a document as
confidential; now such documents need satisfy only a "preponderance of the evidence" test. 49 Fed,
Reg. 21,717 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 0).
The FTC amended its Rule 4.10(a)(3) to reflect the prevailing legal standard-that exemption 5
of the FOIA protects internal agency documents not "routinely" or "normally" available in discovery from disclosure. The FTC has therefore altered its definition of non-public information from
materials not "available" in civil discovery to those not "routinely available" in civil discovery. 49
Fed. Reg. 30,165 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 4).
138. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,248 (1984) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 0, 16, & 50).
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lier versions, 139 others implement procedural modifications designed to
streamline FOIA procedures.' 40 The substantive changes in the guide-

lines focus on two areas: fees and disclosure of business information.
Under the new rule regarding fees, the act of filing a request under the
FOIA "shall be deemed to constitute an agreement by the requester to
pay all applicable fees charged. . . up to $25, unless a waiver of fees is
sought."'' 4 1 This provision, coupled with the restrictive guidelines for fee
waivers issued by the DOJ in January of 1983,142 makes access to DOJ
14 3
records more expensive.
The second substantive change adds a procedure that allows those
who submit business information to the DOJ to receive a written notification if the Department receives a request for the submitted information.' 44 The submitter is then allowed to contest the disclosure by
providing a detailed written statement specifying reasons for withholding
the information. 145 If the Department decides to disclose the information in spite of the submitter's objection, it must, prior to disclosure, furnish the submitter with written notice of its intent. 146 If the Department
elects not to disclose and the requester brings suit, the DOJ must notify
the submitter of the pending litigation.' 47
139. Compare, for example, 28 C.F.R. § 16.41 (1984) with 49 Fed. Reg. 12,254 (1984) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.3).
140. Requests are now sent directly to the various divisions of the DOJ, rather than to the
Assistant Attorney General-the party previously responsible for forwarding them. A list of the
various divisions of the DOJ appears at the end of the rule. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,263 (1984) (App. I to
Pt. 16). The language of the DOJ guidelines implementing both the FOIA and the Privacy Act was
standardized in order to facilitate comparison between the two.
141. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,255 (1984) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(c)).
142. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose to Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies (Jan. 7, 1983), reprintedin IGov'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) 300,815
(Feb. 8, 1983). Courts and agencies are to evaluate fee waiver requests by applying five criteria: (1)
the interest in disclosure must be a general public interest, not a private one; (2) records must meaningfully contribute to the public development or understanding of a subject; (3) denial is appropriate
if the records are already available; (4) the requester must have expertise in the subject area as well as
the ability and the intention to disseminate the requested data to the public; and (5) denial is appropriate if the documents are sought for commercial reasons, for use in litigation, or for ascertaining
what the government knows about the requester. Id. See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
143. A study done by Common Cause, a national citizens lobby whose avowed purpose is to
make government more open and accountable to the public, indicates that a restrictive fee waiver
policy may result in "the worst of all possible scenarios: limited public access to information offset
by a marginal, at best, impact on total FOIA costs." Hearings,supra note 36, at 205 (testimony of
Michal Freedman, Common Cause).
144. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,256 (1984) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.7).
145. Id. This measure parallels the business confidentiality procedures established in the Reform
Act, S.774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 130 CONG. REC. S1795 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). See supra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
146. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,256 (1984) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.7(e)).
147. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,256 (1984) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.7(0).
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Consumer ProductSafety Commission.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) issued new

guidelines in December of 1983 governing the public disclosure of product information that would reveal the identity of a manufacturer or private labeler of a product. 14 8 Pursuant to the terms of subsection (b)(1) of
the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 149 if the information disclosed to a consumer by the CPSC would allow that consumer to ascertain the identity of the submitter, the Commission must provide the
submitter with a reasonable opportunity to send in comments with regard to the propriety of disclosing such information.1 50 In addition, the

Commission is required to "take reasonable steps to assure, prior to its
public disclosure thereof, that information from which the identity of
such manufacturer or private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and that such disclosure is fair in the circumstances and reasonably

1 51
related to effectuating the purposes of this Act."

The CPSC not only issued guidelines detailing the procedure for no-

tifying submitters and reviewing their objections to disclosure,15 2 but also
defined the "reasonable steps" necessary to ensure the accuracy of the
information and the fairness of the disclosure.' 53 The Commission decided that a requester can meet this burden by providing either a "confirmation from consumers" or evidence of an objective investigation by a
qualified expert into the accuracy of the consumer complaints that gave
154
rise to the request for information.
148. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,406 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1101).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (1982).
150. Id. at § 2055(b)(1).
151. Id. Consumer groups use the CPSA to obtain and publish information about harmful or
defective products. Therefore, firms are concerned that the information be "fair and accurate."
152. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,431-33 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1101.21-1101.26). Ifa manufacturer or private labeler wishes to prevent disclosure, the firm must make claims of confidentiality
pursuant to section (a)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(2) (1982), which protects trade secrets,
Any claim of confidentiality must be asserted at the time comments are submitted. Id. at 57,432.
153. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,433-34 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1101.32-1101.33).
154. Any of the following actions are considered "reasonable steps to ensure accuracy": (1) the
Commission staff or a qualified outsider conducts an investigation, inspection, or scientific test which
corroborates the information; (2) the Commission obtains a copy of such an evaluation from a qualified person; and (3) the person who submitted the information to the Commission for review confirms that the information is correct to the best of his or her knowledge, provided that (a) the person
was injured or nearly injured in an incident involving the product in question; (b) the person identifies a defect in the product on the basis of his or her own experience; (c) the person was an eyewitness
to an accident or incident involving the product or the person possesses the requisite training and has
conducted an investigation; or (d) the person is the parent or guardian of a child involved in an
incident with the product. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,433-34 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1101.321101.33).
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In order to ensure fairness, the CPSC will include the manufacturer's or labeler's comments-if the firm so requests-and issue an explanatory statement in conjunction with the release of product

information. 155 In general, however, the Commission retains a wide area
of discretion in limiting the circumstances under which the information
1 56
will be released.

Finally, in reviewing FOIA requests, the Commission will examine
the request in light of the purposes of the CPSA in order to ensure that

the release of product information is reasonably related to effectuating
the purposes of that act.15 7 If faced with a "close case" on disclosure, the
CPSC will then defer to the purposes of the FOIA-"establish[ing] a
general right of the public to have access to information in the Commission's possession." 15 8
C.

Office of Management and Budget.

In a controversial action that was later overruled by Congress, 59
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the agency responsible for
developing guidelines implementing the Privacy Act for all other agen-

cies, revised its Privacy Act Implementing Guidelines to clarify the relationship between the Privacy Act and the FOIA.160 Under the OMB
guidelines, the Privacy Act was declared an exemption 3 statute, so that
an agency would have maintained the same discretion to deny access to
exempt systems of records regardless of whether access was sought under

the FOIA or the Privacy Act.' 61 The guidelines cautioned, however,
that agencies should not rely exclusively on this rule if a, matter pro-

ceeded to litigation in the Third Circuit or District of Columbia Circuit
155. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,434 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1101.33).
156. Id. The guidelines suggest the general steps that the CPSC take to ensure that the release of
information is fair under the circumstances, subject to case-by-case determination by the agency of
what constitutes "fair" under the particular circumstances. The regulation also lists examples of
disclosure circumstances that are not considered fair. These include instances where a firm has a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality with regard to the information; circumstances in which
disclosure would expose work product of attorneys employed by the firm; and the disclosure of a
firm's comments if the firm has specifically requested that they be kept confidential.
157. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,434 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1101.34).
The purposes of the Act are (1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products; (2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products; (3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to minimize
conflicting state and local regulations; and (4) to promote research and investigation into the causes
and prevention of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982).
158. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,434 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1101.34).
159. Congress, in enacting amendments to the National Security Act, invalidated the OMB
guidelines. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
160. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338 (1984) (proposed Aug. 10, 1983).
161. Id.
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because those courts have held that the Privacy Act is not an exemption
3 statute. 162 This warning proved prescient in view of the subsequent
63
passage of the CIA bill, which invalidated the OMB regulation.'
III.

A.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

The FOIA and Civil Discovery: The Scope of Exemption 5.

1. The Machin Privilege: United States v. Weber Aircraft. Exemption 5 of the FOIA excludes from mandatory disclosure "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency." 164 The purpose of the exemption is to incorporate into the
FOIA the government's common law and statutory privileges in the civil
discovery context. 165 It is not always clear, however, whether a particular privilege falls within exemption 5. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
addressed the scope of this exemption, 16 6 and in 1984 it was asked again
to clarify the issue in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.167 The

Court's holding in the case, though helpful, does not entirely resolve the
uncertainty.
In Weber Aircraft, the FOIA plaintiffs were defendants in a damages

action arising from the crash of an Air Force plane. 168 During pretrial
discovery, the defendants sought to discover all of the Air Force investigative reports pertaining to the accident. The Air Force, however, re162. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1983) (Privacy Act and
FOIA provide separate access to information); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d
74 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (material unavailable under Privacy Act is not per se unavailable under FOIA).
163. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
165. Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975).
166. See, e.g., FTC v. Grolier Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2209, 2214 (1983) ("The test under Exemption 5 is
whether the documents would be 'routinely' or 'normally' disclosed upon a showing of relevance.");
Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 353 (1979) ("The House Report [on FOIA]
states that Exemption 5 was intended to allow an agency to withhold intra-agency memoranda
which would not be 'routinely disclosed to a private party through the discovery process in litigation
with the agency.' ") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2428) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.No. 1497]; Renegotiation
Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975) ("Exemption 5 incorporates the
privileges which the government enjoys under the relevant statutory and case law in the pretrial
discovery context."); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975) ("Exemption 5
withholds from a member of the public documents which a private party could not discover in
litigation with the agency."); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973) ("This language clearly contemplates that the public is entitled to all such memoranda or letters that a private party could
discover in litigation with the agency."). See also Note, Developments-1983, supra note 2, at 41013.
167. 104 S.Ct. 1488 (1984).
168. See Hoover v. Weber Aircraft Corp., No. 74-1064-WPG (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1980).
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fused to release certain confidential portions of its safety investigation, t69
relying on the privilege recognized in Machin v. Zukert,170 which held
that statements made to military air crash safety investigators pursuant
17 1
to a promise of confidentiality are exempt from pretrial discovery.
The defendants in Weber Aircraft filed FOIA requests for these confidential statements, and the Air Force continued to refuse to disclose the
72
information.'
The district court concluded that the disputed material would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the

withholding agency, and thus was privileged under exemption

5.173

The

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 174
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that the documents were "intraagency memorandums" within the meaning of exemption 5 and that they
were protected under the Machin privilege in the civil discovery context,
it cited the Supreme Court's decision in FederalOpen Market Committee
v. Merrill175 as authority for holding that the statutory phrase "not...
available by law" was not intended to incorporate every civil discovery
privilege, but only those explicitly recognized in the FOIA's legislative
history.'

76

169. Weber Aircraft, 104 S. Ct. at 1490-9 1.
170. 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
171. Machin, 316 F.2d at 339.
172. Weber Aircraft, 104 S. Ct. at 1491.
173. Id. at 1492.
174. Weber Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 688 F.2d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 1982).
175. 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979).
176. Weber Aircraft, 688 F.2d at 641-42. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the following language from Merrill:
Preliminarily, we note that it is not clear that Exemption 5 was intended to incorporate
every privilege known to civil discovery. . . . Given that Congress specifically recognized
that certain discovery privileges were incorporated into Exemption 5, and dealt with other
civil discovery privileges in exemptions other than Exemption 5, a claim that a privilege
other than executive privilege or the attorney privilege is covered by Exemption 5 must be
viewed with caution.
Merrill, 443 U.S. at 354 (holding that exemption 5 incorporates a qualified privilege for confidential
commercial information) (citations omitted). The Merrill Court made specific exceptions for executive and attorney privileges because both are expressly mentioned in the legislative history. Merrill,
443 U.S. at 355 & n.15 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 166, at 10 ("advice from staff
assistants and the exchange of ideas among agency personnel"), and S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1965) (Exemption 5 includes "the working papers of the agency attorney and documents
which would come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to private parties.") [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 813)).
The Ninth Circuit in Weber Aircraft, 688 F.2d at 642-44, considered and rejected pre-Merrill
decisions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits holding that exemption 5 incorporated the Machin
privilege. See Cooper v. Department of the Navy, 558 F.2d 274, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1977), modified on
other grounds, 594 F.2d 484, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); Brockway v. Department of the Air
Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1193 (8th Cir. 1975).
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.1 7 7 Re-

viewing its earlier decisions involving the scope of exemption 5, the
Court stressed that "the holding of Merrill was that a privilege that was

mentioned in the legislative history of Exemption 5 is incorporated by
the exemption-not that all privileges not mentioned are excluded.'

78

The Court continued:
It is one thing to say that recognition under Exemption 5 of a novel
privilege, or one that has found less than universal acceptance, might
not fall within Exemption 5 if not discussed in its legislative history. It
is quite another to say that the Machin privilege, which has been wellsettled for some two decades, need be viewed with the same degree of

skepticism. 179
A contrary ruling, the Court observed, would "create an anomaly in that
the FOIA could be used to supplement civil discovery," 1 80 a position the

Court has consistently rejected.181
The Court thus rejected the theory that the legislative history of

exemption 5 contained a "comprehensive list of all privileges Congress
intended to adopt," and concluded that Congress had merely provided
certain "rough analogies." 18 2 Weber Aircraft provides a somewhat im-

proved guide for lower courts, yet by not resolving the future applicability of exemption 5 to a "novel privilege," it clearly falls short of

providing a roadmap for determining the exemption's applicability to
discovery privileges less "well-settled" than the Machin privilege, as well
as to discovery privileges that courts may develop in the future.
2. Predecisional Memoranda: Environmental Defense Fund v.
Office of Management & Budget. The scope of exemption 5 was also
the subject of significant litigation before the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. In EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Office of
Management & Budget, a case consolidated at the appellate level with
177. WeberAircraft, 104 S.Ct. at 1495.
178. Id. at 1493 (citing Merrill, 443 U.S. at 357-60) (emphasis in original). The Court noted that
Merrill involved a claimed privilege not clearly falling within any recognized civil discovery privilege; inquiry into legislative intent was therefore appropriate. Id.
179. Weber Aircraft, 104 S.Ct. at 1494.
180. Id. (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n.14 (1982) (primary purpose of FOIA is
not to benefit private litigants or serve as substitute for civil discovery)).
181. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) (FOIA's fundamental purpose is to inform public about agency action); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing
Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (discovery is not an expressly indicated purpose of the FOIA).
182. WeberAircraft, 104 S.Ct. at 1494, 1495 n.22, (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973),
H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 166, at 10; S.REP. No. 813,supra note 176, at 9; and Administrative
Procedure Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., IstSess. 196, 206, 366-67, 418 (1965)).
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Bureau of NationalAffairs v. United States Departmentof Justice,183 the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sought the disclosure of materials
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the latter's budget requests.' 84 The budget figures later proposed by the President to Congress
differed from the EPA's recommendations. This fact lent support to the
OMB's argument that, because the President is ultimately responsible for
submitting a final budget proposal to Congress, any agency recommendation made to him is merely advisory, and is thus a predecisional, deliber-

ative interagency memorandum; 185 such memoranda fall within

186
exemption 5, which incorporates the government's executive privilege.
Exemption 5 of the FOIA applies to advice, recommendations, or
opinions that are "predecisional" in that they actually precede adoption
of agency policy. 187 The purpose of the privilege is to ensure candor in
the decisionmaking process, by protecting from public dissemination the
exchanges of opinion that often precede the formulation of a final pol-

icy.' 88 When a government agency invokes this exemption in a FOIA

action, the agency bears the burden of showing that the material requested is predecisional. 189
The district court in Environmental Defense Fund concluded that
the EPA's budget recommendations were not predecisional, but instead
reflected a final decision by the agency regarding its 1982 budget request;
183. 742 F.2d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra notes 255-80 and accompanying text for another
aspect of the case. Although both cases are reported under the name, Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v.
United StatesDep't ofJustice, subsequent references in text and footnotes will, for clarity, distinguish
between the two cases by name.
184. The materials reflected the EPA's assessment of its 1982 funding needs for the Superfund,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
185. Environmental Defense Fund, 742 F.2d at 1496.
186. Id. Predecisional memoranda falling within exemption 5 are those "prepared in order to
assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision," whereas postdecisional memoranda are
records "setting forth the reasons for an agency decision already made." Renegotiation Bd. v.
Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975). Interagency, as well as intra-agency,
memoranda are included: "Congress plainly intended to permit one agency possessing decisional
authority to obtain written recommendations and advice from a separate agency not possessing such
decisional authority without requiring that the advice be any more disclosable than similar advice
received from within the agency." Id. at 188.
187. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-53 (1975); Jordan v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc). The purpose of exemption 5 is "to protect
the deliberative process of the government, by ensuring that persons in an advisory role would be
able to express their opinions freely to agency decision-makers without fear of publicity [that might]
inhibit frank discussion of policy matters and likely impair the quality of decisions." Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
188. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1975).
189. Environmental Defense Fund, 742 F.2d at 1497.
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the district court therefore ordered disclosure. 190 . The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, however,

holding that the district court's opinion misinterpreted the meaning of
the phrase "final decision" in exemption 5.191 According to the Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engi-

neering Corp., 192 opinions authored by one agency and communicated to
an agency having final decisional authority are predecisional materials
within the meaning of exemption 5. Accordingly, the court of appeals in
EnvironmentalDefense Fund concluded that, because the President is not
bound in any way by the funding requests of federal agencies, "their
budgetary 'decisions' constitute advice and suggestions for the President"
rather than final agency decisions and are therefore exempt. 193

The reversal of the district court's decision in Environmental Defense Fund suggests that despite the Supreme Court's decision a decade
ago in Grumman Aircraft, ambiguity persists in the concept of "predecisional" materials. In Environmental Defense Fund, the budget recommendation at the center of the dispute represented a final determination
within the agency as to its 1982 budget requirements; the memorandum
was predecisional solely because the agency lacked authority to act on its

own decision. In such a case, a document may be final with respect to
the agency, and its contents may be largely factual, revealing little of the

subjective decisional process; 194 nonetheless, under the rationale of the
District of Columbia Circuit, the document may be predecisional. The
Court of Appeals' holding in EnvironmentalDefense Fund suggests that

this influential circuit will take a broad view of what constitutes
"predecisional memoranda" in the future.

190. Id. at 1496-97 (citing unpublished district court opinion).
191. Id. at 1497.
192. 421 U.S. 168, 187-88 (1975).
193. Environmental Defense Fund, 742 F.2d at 1497. Although the court conceded that such
"suggestions" are "likely to frame the ultimate budgetary choices made by" the President, it nonetheless distinguished such suggestions from predecisional recommendations "expressly adopted as
the basis for agency action," which, according to the court of appeals, lose their exemption 5 status.
Id. (quoting Afshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1140, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). In the
instant case, the EPA's 1982 budgetary recommendations were never adopted by the President. A
finding that such interagency recommendations were "final," the court ruled, would render exemption 5 an "empty shell." Environmental Defense Fund, 742 F.2d at 1497.
194. A budget request has elements of factual reporting as well as elements suggesting advice or
opinion; only the latter will trigger the exemption. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (unevaluated factual report not exempt as predecisional; to be exempt, it must
reflect opinion or recommendations).
The broad scope of what the District of Columbia Circuit considers to be "predecisional" material is somewhat at odds with the First Circuit's dictum in Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n,
730 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 317 (1984). See infra note 250.

Vol. 1985:742]

B.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The "Confidential Source" Exemption and the Test of
Confidentiality.

Exemption 7(D) of the FOIA exempts from disclosure "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" to the extent that

their production would "disclose the identity of a confidential source
and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,. . . confidential information furnished only by the confidential source." 195 The policy
underlying this broad exemption is "that law enforcement agencies
should not be faced with a 'drying up' of their sources of information or
196
have their criminal investigative work be seriously impaired."'
195. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982). This exemption differs from other FOIA exemptions because its operation in many cases does not depend on the information contained in the requested
document, but rather on the source of the information. If the source is confidential, then the information is exempt from disclosure. See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 492 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
Exemption (b)(7) reads in full:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(7)

investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information
furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel[.]

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982).
196. Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 1979)
(citing FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502), SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 381, 391-92, 451, 468, 473, 476

(Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK]).
The tension between the FOIA's broad underlying policy of disclosure and Congress's concern
that this policy not impede the investigative work of law enforcement agencies is illustrated in the
legislative history of exemption 7(D). As originally enacted, exemption 7 excluded from disclosure
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a
private party." Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(7), 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966) (codified as amended by Pub.
L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967), at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1982)). See Center for Nat'l Policy Review
on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (once court determines
that materials requested are "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes," its inquiry
is at an end). This broad exemption was narrowed when exemption 7 was enacted in its present form
in the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1563 (1974), which
limited the exemption to particular types of information contained within the investigative files. As
originally proposed by Senator Hart, the 1974 amendment exempted:
[i]nvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that
the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication or constitute a clearly
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The federal courts of appeals are divided on the appropriate standard for a finding of "confidentiality" in the context of information supplied to federal law enforcement officials pursuant to a criminal
investigation. Three distinct approaches have evolved. In the absence of
"an express assurance of confidentiality," 1 97 the Second 9 8 and Fourth' 99
Circuits require that the agency show "that the information was furnished under circumstances from which an assurance of confidentiality
could be reasonably inferred. ' '2°0 These courts treat the existence of an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (C) disclose the identity of an informer, or (D)
disclose investigatory techniques and procedures.
120 CONG. REC. 17,033 (1974), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra at 332.
Hart's proposal was criticized as making the scope of the exemption far too narrow. Although
the Senate passed the Hart amendment, no similar language appeared in the House bill. When the
matter arose before a House-Senate conference committee, President Ford expressed the concerns of
the amendment's critics in a letter to the conference committee:
I am concerned with any provision which could reduce our ability to effectively deal with
crime. This amendment could have that effect if the sources of information or the information itself are disclosed. These sources and the information by which they may be identified must be protected in order not to severely hamper our efforts to combat crime.
SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 369-70, quoted in Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1980) (local
law enforcement agency can constitute a "confidential source" for FOIA purposes).
These concerns prompted the adoption of exemption 7(D) in its present and broader form,
which substitutes "confidential source" for "informer," and which ensures that "the agency not only
can withhold information which would disclose the identity of a confidential source but also can
provide blanket protection for any information supplied by a confidential source." 120 CONG. REc.
36,871 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 451. Hart's statement
in support of the modified bill went further, adding that the FBI need not "prove that disclosure
would reveal an informer's identity; all the FBI has to do is to state that the information was furnished by a confidential source and it is exempt." Id. The breadth of Hart's claim contradicts the
express language of the Conference Report, which states that a confidential source's identity "may be
protected if the person provided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in
circumstances from which such assurance would be reasonably inferred." FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS, CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1974) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT], reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 230,
quoted in Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1977) (existence of express
or implied assurance of confidentiality is a question of fact). The divergence between these two
standards has apparently contributed to the split among the federal courts of appeals on this issue.
See infra notes 198-231 and accompanying text. Given the inherent conflict in the legislative history,
the view expressed by the Conference Committee in its official report should be given greater weight
as coming from the more authoritative source.
197. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 196, at 13.
198. See Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1980) (whether local law enforcement
agency provided information under such assurance is question of fact).
199. See Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003-04 (4th Cir. 1978) (it suffices to show that the
information was furnished under circumstances in which an assurance of confidentiality could be
reasonably inferred); see also Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1977)
(analyzing confidentiality along the same lines, but in the context of a noncriminal investigation). In
at least one decision, the Fifth Circuit has apparently adopted the same approach. See Pope v.
United States, 599 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1979) (highly damaging character of information
supplied to FBI creates strong inference that interviewee had expectation of confidentiality).
200. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1978); see also CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 196, at 13 (similar language).
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express or implied assurance of confidentiality as a question of fact. 20 1 In
contrast, within the Third Circuit there is authority both for this standard and for an alternative rule-that a criminal law enforcement agency
need only "state that the information was furnished by a confidential
source" in order to establish confidentiality. 20 2 Finally, the Sixth 20 3 and
Seventh 2°4 Circuits have apparently adopted the rule that "[u]nless there
is evidence to the contrary in the record, . . . promises of confidentiality
are inherently implicit in FBI interviews conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation. ' 20 5 This standard imposes no burden of proof on the
government beyond stating the exemptions invoked and the reasons for
20 6
their applicability.
201. Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1980); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548
F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1977).
202. Compare Conoco, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1982)
(if plaintiff is the subject of criminal investigation of price control violations, then to claim exemption
under 7(D), agency need only identify the document and state that the information was furnished by
a confidential source; requiring more detail would increase possibility of revealing source and content) with Lame v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 927-29 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring
detailed explanation showing assurance of confidentiality with respect to each alleged confidential
source). The apparent source for the Conoco standard is a comment by Senator Hart. See 120
CONG.REc. 36,871 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 196, at 451. For a discussion of
Hart's comment, see supra note 196.
Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 739
F.2d 1514, 1517 (10th Cir. 1984), characterized the approach of the District of Columbia Circuit as
consistent with that of the Third Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit appears to take an approach that actually falls somewhere between that of the Third Circuit and that of the Second and
Fourth Circuits. See, eg., Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 491-92 & n.114
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (if Department of Justice affidavits aver that police records were provided with
explicit understanding of confidentiality, then detailed explanation found unnecessary; Senator
Hart's statement quoted as support); Shaw v. United States Dep't of State, 559 F. Supp. 1053, 1064
(D.D.C. 1983) (agency affidavits demonstrated "at least an implied assurance of confidentiality");
Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 564-65 (D.D.C. 1981) (fact that interviews were conducted in
connection with criminal investigation that included a grand jury proceeding cannot alone support
finding of implicit confidentiality; more detailed statement necessary to support inference of confidentiality); Malloy v. United States Dep't of Justice, 457 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D.D.C. 1978) (agency
affidavit asserted both express and implicit assurances).
203. Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir. 1983) (promise of confidentiality
held "inherently implicit" in FBI interviews pursuant to criminal investigation, and FBI need not
prove it extended such promise to interviewee as condition of interview).
204. Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1981) (promise of confidentiality "inherently
implicit" in FBI interviews pursuant to criminal investigation; fact that one interviewee denied that
such promises were made could refute this inference only with respect to her own interview), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170, 176 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1978) (seriousness
of criminal allegations against plaintiff implied necessity of protecting persons interviewed; court
rejects argument that some information may no longer be exempt once interviewee has testified at
trial), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964 (1979). But see Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir.
1977) (finding an express or implied assurance of confidentiality, and not reaching question of
whether lesser showing would be adequate to support exemption).
205. Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
206. Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170, 175-76 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964 (1979).
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In 1984, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a district
court in the Ninth Circuit, addressed this same issue. Unfortunately,
each opinion adopted a different standard of "confidentiality." In Parton
v. United States Department of Justice,2 07 the Eighth Circuit apparently
adopted the "reasonable inference" standard of the Second and Fourth
Circuits, 20 8 although its brief opinion is somewhat ambiguous. Parton
involved a federal prisoner's request for materials compiled in the course
of an FBI investigation of alleged prisoner abuse by prison officials. The
FBI released a portion of the information requested but refused to reveal
the identities-or any statements that would disclose the identities-of
prison officials and inmates interviewed during the investigation. 20 9 In
the district court, the FBI submitted an affidavit setting forth in detail
the exemptions claimed for each withholding and the reasons why each
exemption applied. The court completely ignored the FBI's exemption
7(D) claim, 2 10 and, finding exemption 7(C) inapplicable, ordered disclo2 11
sure of the identities of the sources.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court, ruling that the FBI affidavit "adequately stated its grounds for
nondisclosure" under 7(D) because it "clearly show[ed] that the prison
officials who provided information did so under circumstances from
' 2 12
which assurances of confidentiality could reasonably be inferred.
The court failed to make clear, however, what type of factual showing
213
was necessary to satisfy this standard.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. United
States Department of Justice 21 4 examined all three approaches and
adopted the "inherently implicit" standard of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 21 5 The plaintiff in Johnson sought the contents of an FBI file containing records of a 1979 criminal investigation of the plaintiff by the
207. 727 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1984).
208. Id. at 776-77.
209. Id. at 775.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing unpublished district court opinion). For the text of exemption 7(C), see supra
note 195.
212. Parton, 727 F.2d at 776. The court also emphasized the dangers of reprisal and of impeding
future investigations if disclosure were ordered. Id. at 776-77 (citing Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d
998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1978) (danger of reprisal against guard and inmate informants is one factor
supporting a 7(D) claim)).
213. Id. at 776. The court introduced further ambiguity by quoting, from the FOIA's legislative
history, the very language that is the foundation of the conflicting standard used in the Third Circuit. For a discussion of the legislative history cited by the court, see the statements of Senator Hart
quoted supra note 196.
214. 739 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1984).
215. Id. at 1518.
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agency. 21 6 The FBI disclosed some of the requested materials, and justified its withholding of the remainder under exemptions 7(C) 2 17 and
7(D).2 18 The district court conducted an in camera review of the with2 19
held information and summarily ordered disclosure of the entire file.
On appeal, the court of appeals conducted its own in camera review and
reversed the district court, concluding that all of the withheld information was exempt under either 7(C) or 7(D). 220 The court found that assurances of confidentiality are "inherently implicit" in FBI interviews
conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation, 221 reasoning that "[t]his
approach best reconciles the general desirability of broad disclosure
under the FOIA with the concern that, absent a robust 7(D) exemption,
law enforcement agencies would be faced with a 'drying up' of their
sources of information and their investigative work thereby would be se'222
riously impeded.
Refusing to be bound by the conflicting standards that have evolved
in the various federal courts of appeals, in 1984 a federal district court in
California expressly rejected the "inherently implicit" standard. In Powell v. United States Department of Justice,223 the plaintiff, indicted between 1956 and 1961 for acts of sedition and treason, challenged the
Justice Department's claimed 7(D) exemption 224 for the withheld portions of the investigative records. 225 In granting plaintiff's motion for an
in camera review, the court explained its decision to deny the government's summary judgment motion. Although the court acknowledged
the existence of contrary authority both in other circuits and, at the district court level, within the Ninth Circuit itself,226 it did not accept the
proposition that "all persons interviewed by the FBI receive an implied
216. Id. at 1515.
217. For the text of exemption 7(C), see supra note 195.
218. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1515-16.
219. Id. at 1515.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1518.
222. Id. (citing Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 196, at 456-59, 468).
223. 584 F. Supp. 1508 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
224. For the text of exemption 7(D), see supra note 195.
225. Powell, 584 F. Supp. at 1511.
226. Id. at 1528 (citing Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1981) ("inherently implicit"
standard), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th
Cir. 1983) (same); and Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (applying
"functional approach" to find implied assurance in all FBI interviews, because FBI's "investigatory
function depends for its existence upon information supplied by individuals who in many cases
would suffer severe detriment if their identities were known")).
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Instead, the district court suggested its

own analysis. It held that each type of information withheld requires a
separate factual inquiry, and that confidentiality is implied "when the
source would hardly have supplied the information unless it were confident that its identity would remain concealed. 2 2 8 Absent evidence to
the contrary, the court asserted, such an inference is reasonable if the
information divulged pertains to the conduct of a suspected criminal, but
not if it involves matters unrelated to the "normal trial issues. ' 229 The
court also found it necessary to consider any facts that might undercut
this presumed expectation of confidentiality. 23 0 The court implied that
both the existence of an implied assurance of confidentiality and the
existence of any waiver of this privilege by the source are questions of
23 1
fact to be determined by reviewing the entire record.
Powell's ad hoe "expectations" approach attempts selectively to reduce the agency's burden of proof by singling out certain factual settings
that give rise to a presumption of confidentiality. In contrast to the more
sweeping approaches of the federal courts of appeals, the Powell approach requires a more detailed inquiry by the reviewing court; although
this inquiry places a heavier burden on judicial resources by necessitating
more frequent recourse to in camera review, it nonetheless seems more
consistent both with the FOIA's broad policy of disclosure and with the
legislative intent that specifically underlies exemption 7(D).
C. Defining "'Agency Records."
1. Presentence Reports: A "Crowded Corner" of the Law. Because only federal agency records are subject to the FOIA's mandatory
disclosure provisions, a recurrent theme in FOIA litigation is the defini227. Powell, 584 F. Supp. at 1528-29. The court found this approach "inconsistent with the
requirement that the court engage in de novo review and with the express language of the Conference
Report. Under the Report, whether confidentiality has been implied is a question of fact which must
be determined from the surrounding circumstances.
... Id. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 196, at 13.
228. Powell, 584 F. Supp. at 1529 (quoting Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 564 (D.C. Cir.
1981)). The court observed that "Congress . . . did not intend to place a heavy burden on the
Agency in claiming that information was provided under an implied assurance of confidentiality."
Id.
229. Id. In this case, for example, such matters included information about the alleged conduct
of the United States in Korea. Id.
230. Id. Examples are the interviewee who has already testified, has agreed to testify in the near
future, or is under a military duty to disclose the required information. In the case of informants
who have agreed to testify, the court added, treating such persons as confidential sources "accords
neither with the plain meaning of 'confidential,' nor with the legislative purpose of Exemption 7D."
Id.
231. Id. at 1530.
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This issue was heavily litigated in 1984 in

the context of the criminal presentence report.
Pursuant to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 33 the presentence report is prepared by the federal district court
probation officer for use by the federal court; like Congress, the federal

courts are expressly excluded from FOIA coverage. 234 Much of the information contained in the presentence report is necessarily obtained

under assurances of confidentiality. After sentencing, however, the probation officer must, on request, transmit a copy to the United States Pa-

role Commission, 2 35 an agency subject to the FOIA. 236 A prisoner's
FOIA request to the Commission for release of his presentence report
thus raises the question whether, upon transmittal, the report loses its

exempt status as a court document and becomes an agency record subject
to mandatory disclosure under the FOIA.

Prior to 1984, three circuits had considered this question. In Carson
v. United States Department of Justice,237 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that presentence reports are "agency
records" under the FOIA, declaring the Tenth Circuit's contrary position 238 obsolete because of subsequent legislation. 239 Three years later,
232. 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). The FOIA does not define the term "agency record" and
"the legislative history yields insignificant insight into Congress' conception of the sorts of materials
the Act covers." McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1106 (footnote omitted), modified in other respects, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of McGehee and the problem of defining
"agency records," see Note, Developments-1983, supra note 2, at 394-402.
233. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
234. The Freedom of Information Act applies only to "agencies." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
For FOIA purposes, "agencies" are defined by section 551 of Title 5,which provides: "For the
purpose of this subchapter(1) agency means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States[.]"
235. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(e) (1982).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 4218(a) (1982).
237. 631 F.2d 1008, 1011-15 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Carson applied, by analogy, the "control" test
developed in Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1978), for determining the FOIA status of
documents created by Congress and transferred to agencies: "Whether a congressionally generated
document has become an agency record. . . depends on whether under all the facts of the case the
document has passed from the control of Congress and become property subject to the free disposition of the agency with which the document resides." Carson, 631 F.2d at 1010.
238. Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885, 885 (10th Cir. 1968).
239. Carson, 631 F.2d at 1011-15. The Tenth Circuit ruled in Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d
885, 885 (10th Cir. 1968), that a presentence report is not an agency record, because it remains
within the exclusive control of the court even after it is obtained by prison authorities, who are
subject to the FOIA. After the Cook decision, the 1975 amendment to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) and
the passage of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (the Parole Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 42014218 (1982), reduced the control retained by the court over the report and increased the control that
becomes vested in the Parole Commission after it acquires the report.
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however, in United States v. Charmer Industries, the Second Circuit
adopted the Tenth Circuit's "obsolete" position, holding that after transmittal the report retains its status as a court document. 240 In 1984, a
flurry of litigation in this area created what one court 24 1 labeled a

"crowded corner of the law," as federal courts of appeals in four circuits
considered the FOIA status of presentence reports, with three of these
circuits addressing the issue for the first time.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adhered

2 42
to its Carson position in Lykins v. United States Departmentof Justice,

and the Ninth Circuit followed this lead in Berry v. Departmentof Justice
by declaring that presentence reports are agency records. 243 The position
originally maintained by the Department of Justice-that the degree of
control exercised by the federal agency receiving the presentence report
244was insufficient to overcome the report's status as a court document

persuaded the First and Eleventh Circuits to hold, in Crooker v. United
States Parole Commission2 45 and Lindsey v. Bureau of Prisons246 respectively, that a presentence report does not become an "agency record"
247
merely because it is obtained by an agency subject to the FOIA.

Shortly after this circuit split materialized, however, the Department of Justice retreated from its position that presentence reports are
not agency records under the FOIA. In the Department's brief submit-

ted to the Supreme Court in opposition to a petition for a writ of certioAt the time of Cook, the sentencing court had the discretion to refuse to disclose the report to
the criminal defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2) (Supp. 1966) (amended 1975). Under the 1975
amendment, verbatim disclosure is required except as to material that "in the opinion of the court
. . . contains diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources
of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. . . ." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
The Parole Act requires the Parole Commission to consider presentence reports in making its
determinations. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1982). Before 1976, this consideration was not expressly required. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970) (repealed 1976). Carson found this express requirement persuasive
evidence that the presentence report was subject to agency control. Carson, 631 F.2d at 1012; see
also Lykins v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying
Carson).
240. 711 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983).
241. Lykins v. Rose, Civil Action No. 82-0241, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1984) (mem.).
242. 725 F.2d 1455, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In addition, the Lykins court held that even if the
originating court specifically prohibits the report's subsequent release by the agency receiving it, a
refusal to disclose by that agency may nonetheless constitute an "improper" withholding under the
FOIA. Id. at 1458-59.
243. 733 F.2d 1343, 1350-52 (9th Cir. 1984).
244. Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir.), vacated and remanded,
105 S. Ct. 317 (1984).
245. 730 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 317 (1984).
246. 736 F.2d 1462 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
247. Crooker, 730 F.2d at 10; Lindsey, 736 F.2d at 1464-67.
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rari in Crooker, the Solicitor General announced that the Department
had "reassessed [its] position" and determined that the Parole Commission "will not in the future withhold copies of presentence reports on the
ground that they are not 'agency records' for purposes of the FOIA." 24 8
Despite this concession, however, the Department of Justice expressly
reaffirmed its position on the larger issue-that "presentence reports are
clearly exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA" 249-by relying on two types of exemption claims. The Department first argued that
even if the report is an agency record, it is exempt in its entirety as a
predecisional memorandum under exemption 5.250 Furthermore, it argued, even if the report is not exempt in its entirety, "especially sensitive
portions" are protected by exemptions 3, 4, 6 and 7, as is true of any
record covered by the FOIA. 25 1
The Justice Department's change of position has added to the confusion surrounding the FOIA status of records created by exempt entities
and transmitted to agencies subject to the FOIA, an issue that may arise
again outside of the presentence report context.2 52 The Supreme Court
248. Brief for Respondent at 7, Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 317 (1984).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 18-19. The potential applicability of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982) was noted in dictum
by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Croaker,730 F.2d at 9. Two district
courts in the Third Circuit have found exemption 5 to be applicable to presentence reports. Smith v.
Flaherty, 465 F. Supp. 815, 819 & n.12 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (citing Green v. Taylor, Civ. No. 750140
(M.D. Pa. May 7, 1975) (Order, Sheridan, C.J.)). The Crooker court noted, however, that "most
courts have limited the scope of exemption 5 to protect from disclosure only those documents that
reflect inter- or intra-agency 'give and take' during policy development." Thus "[p]resentence reports may well not fit within this exemption." Crooker, 730 F.2d at 9. This view of exemption 5 is
relatively restrictive compared to the broad view taken this year by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Office of Management
& Budget, 742 F.2d 1484, 1496-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supranotes 183-94 and accompanying text.
251. Brief for Respondent at 18-21, Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 317
(1984).
252. Contrary to the respondent's claim in Croaker,Brief for Respondent at 22-23, Crooker v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 317 (1984), this issue is likely to arise again in another
context. Analogous problems involving records that originate in governmerlt departments not subject to the FOIA, such as Congress or the President's office, but which are later transferred to
agencies subject to FOIA, have already arisen. Compare Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 347 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (Congressional intent to retain control over transcripts transferred to the CIA sufficient to
find that such transcripts are not "agency records") with Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 155-57 (1980) (if documents originated in office of President, then correct
inquiry is whether recipient agency has actually obtained control) and Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686,
693 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (attempting to reconcile Goland and Kissinger by finding that an agency cannot
lawfully obtain control if Congress has manifested its intent to retain control). See also Tigar &
Buffone v. United States Dep't of Justice, 590 F. Supp. 1012, 1014-15 (D.D.C. 1984) (documents
subpoenaed by federal grand jury and then impounded by Department of Justice pursuant to court
order did not become agency records subject to FOIA).
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and the

impact of the Department's new two-tiered argument is unknown at
present.

254

2. Personal Records of Agency Officials and "Agency Record"
Status. The definition of "agency records" was litigated in another context in Bureau of National Affairs v. United States Department of Jus253. The First Circuit in Crooker observed that the problems with the presentence report resulted from its "hybrid function." Croaker, 730 F.2d at 3.
254. With regard to the Department's new arguments, the applicability of exemptions 4, 6, and 7
invites resolution on a case-by-case basis. The exemption 5 claim, however, turns on the question of
whether the presentence report is, by its very nature, a privileged document. The Solicitor General's
position is that because "the presentence report is privileged from discovery by third parties while in
the possession of the Parole Commission, the Commission's copy of the report is exempt from
mandatory disclosure" under the FOIA. Brief for Respondent at 18, Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 105 S.Ct. 317 (1984). It is therefore irrelevant, according to the Solicitor General's
argument, that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) permit the prisoner to read the report prior to sentencing and prior to his parole hearing: "The pertinent question
under the FOIA . . .is whether the document must be released to any member of the public at
large, not simply to a person who has a special interest in the document." Brief for Respondent at
19, Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 105 S.Ct. 317 (1984). See also supra note 250.
The Department's new exemption 3 claim will require a determination of whether section 4208
of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1982), qualifies as an exempting statute. The Ninth Circuit has already answered in the affirmative. See Berry v. Department of
Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984).
Although Crooker was remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Solicitor General's change in position, 105 S.Ct. 317 (1984), it is uncertain whether the First Circuit will
hear these new arguments. In a presentence report case remanded in 1984 by the District of Columbia Circuit, Crooker v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 83-01838, (D.C. Cir. April 10, 1984)
(not to be confused with the First Circuit's Croaker case), the court of appeals refused to grant a stay
to permit the government to develop exemption claims that it had not raised originally in the district
court, ruling that only "extraordinary circumstances" justify consideration on remand of claims not
raised at the agency level or in the district court. Id. at 1. Such circumstances, according to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, are present if there has been a "substantial
change" in the factual context of a case or in the applicable legal doctrine, as well as where the
material withheld is extremely sensitive, but not where the exemption claims are invoked merely to
gain a tactical advantage. Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en banc). See also Lykins v. Rose, No. 82-0241, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1984)
(mem.) (exception "should not apply when the exemption was available but the government, as a
result of a deliberate, tactical decision, simply chose not to assert it").
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a position more receptive to the government's new
exemption claims. In Cotner v. United States Parole Comm'n, 747 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1984), the
court held, on facts similar to those before the First Circuit in Crooker, that the government was not
barred from asserting its new exemption claims on remand to the district court. Id. at 1018-19.
Although it acknowledged "the policy ordinarily precluding consideration of exemptions not
presented to the district court at the earliest opportunity," it noted that under 28 C.F.R. § 0.20, the
Solicitor General was not required to review the government's position until the First Circuit's
Croaker decision had reached the Supreme Court. Cotner, 747 F.2d at 1018. The resulting change in
policy, the court concluded, was not an attempt to gain a tactical advantage, but a "considered
review consistent with the historically unique . . . relationship between the office of Solicitor General and the Supreme Court." Id. at 1018-19.
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tice 2 55 and Environmental Defense Fund v. Office of Management &
Budget,25 6 two cases consolidated for appeal before the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Unlike the issue
of presentence reports, the question in these cases did not involve the
status of records created by an exempt entity and then physically transferred to an agency subject to the FOIA; rather, the question was
whether appointment calendars, telephone logs and daily agendas that
are created by agency officials for their personal use are "agency records"
subject to the FOIA. 2 57 The larger issue was "under what circumstances
. . . an individual's creation of a record [can] be attributed to the agency,
thereby making the material an 'agency record' disclosable under FOIA,

rather than personal material not covered by the Act

[.]-258

Bureau of NationalAffairs involved a request for appointment calendars and daily agendas pertaining to meetings between William Baxter,
who was then Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, and
parties outside the Justice Department. 259 The district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment on the ground that such
documents are not "agency records" but personal papers that "exist essentially only for the convenience of their author" and "were not created
at the request of or for the convenience of the agency"; thus "they play
'260
absolutely no role in the agency's recordkeeping program.
In EnvironmentalDefense Fund, the requested records included the
daily appointment calendars and telephone message slips of several OMB
officials. 261 In two of the contested instances, only the authors had access
to the calendars; in two others, only the authors and their secretaries had
access; and in a fifth instance, only the author's immediate staff had access. 262 The district court ruled that both the appointment calendars and
the telephone message memoranda were agency records and ordered the
263
OMB to submit a Vaughn index of the documents.
255. 742 F.2d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1486.
258. Id. at 1489.
259. The daily agendas were prepared by Baxter's secretary and distributed to his staff. Bureau
ofNat'l Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1487. The calendars included both business and personal appointments;
a few staff members occasionally had access to the calendars in order to locate Baxter. The calendars generally indicated the place of the meeting, persons expected to attend, and, on occasion, the
meeting's purpose. Id.
260. Id. (quoting Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v. United States Dep't. of Justice, Civ. Action No. 8201211 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 1982)).
261. Id. The calendars contained essentially the same type of information as those involved in
Bureau of Nat'! Affairs.

262. Id. at 1488.
263. Id.; See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974). The Vaughn court held that the government must supply to a FOIA requester any reason-
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In addressing the FOIA status of these records, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's
1980 decision in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press.264 In Kissinger, the Supreme Court established that the mere physical location of papers in an agency does not confer "agency record" sta-

tus if the records neither enter that department's files nor are "used by
the Department for any purpose. ' 265 The court of appeals inferred from
Kissinger's analysis that, in deciding "agency record" status, a court

must consider whether the document in question is: (1) in the agency's
control, (2) generated within the agency, (3) placed in the agency's files,
and (4) used by the agency "for any purpose."' 266 In applying the Kissinger standards, the court of appeals in Bureau of NationalAffairs de-

clined to adopt either a "control" or a "use" analysis exclusively,
reasoning instead that "the inquiry necessarily must focus on a variety of
factors surrounding the creation, possession, control, and use of the doc'267
ument by an agency.
ably segregable, non-exempt portions of documents that it claims are partially exempt. Id. at 825-27.
Vaughn disapproved of resolving factual disputes in FOIA cases on the basis of conclusory affidavits,
and held that the government must supply the requester with a detailed index itemizing the material
withheld and justifying each claimed exemption. Id. at 826-28.
264. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
265. Id. at 157 (notes of telephone conversations taken by President's former national security
advisor did not become agency records when they were later physically located in State Department), quoted in Environmental Defense Fund, 742 F.2d at 1489-90.
266. Bureau of Nat' Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1489-90 (finding that the Kissinger Court focused on
these four factors).
267. Id. at 1490 (citing Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.)
(" '[C]ontrol' for FOIA purposes [may have] no precise definition and may well change as relevant
factors assume varying importance from case to case."), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 317
(1984)). See supra notes 232-54 and accompanying text. The Bureau of Nat'l Affairs court seemed
to suggest a hybrid approach, stating:
In certain contexts, such as where a document is created by one agency and transferred to a
second agency, control or possession is the critical analysis. But in cases such as these,
where documents are created by an agency employee and located within the agency, use of
the document becomes more important in determining the status of the document under
FOIA.
Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1490.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also noted that, contrary to the
government's argument, an analysis that considers the agency's use of or reliance on the disputed
materials in determining their FOIA status is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980). In Forsham, petitioners sought FOIA disclosure of raw
data that were created and held by a private organization under a federal grant. Pursuant to federal
regulations, such data were available upon request to the agencies that had funded the program.
The Court in Forsham refused to order the agency to exercise its right of access to the data because
such an order would compel the agency to "create" a record, a result that went beyond the bounds

of the FOIA. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186. See also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,
161-62 (1975) (FOIA imposes no duty to create records). The Court in Forsham rejected the argument that an agency's reliance on the information held by the grant recipient converted the data into
an agency record: "[W]ithout first establishing that the agency has created or obtained the docu-
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The District of Columbia Circuit held that, under the facts of Bureau of National Affairs and EnvironmentalDefense Fund, if a record is
generated by an agency employee "at least in part to enable him or her to
conduct agency business. . . it is necessary to consider both the agency's
asserted interest in the document and the extent to which the document
is used to conduct agency business. ' 268 It added that a court should consider the other Kissinger factors as well, to avoid conferring "agency record" status on "an employee's record that happens to be physically
26 9
located within the agency."
A further complication was whether the FOIA status of the disputed documents was affected by the fact that they were "non-record
materials" that an agency is not required to preserve under federal
records management statutes.270 The Supreme Court in Forsham v. Harris2 7 t had expressly left open the question whether such materials constitute "agency records" under the FOIA. 272 The District of Columbia

Circuit in Bureau of NationalAffairs rejected the government's invitation
to hold that the treatment of documents for disposal and retention purposes under such records statutes determines their status under the
FOIA. "However tempting such a 'bright-line' test may be," the court
observed, "it cannot be used as the divining rod for the meaning of

'agency records' under FOIA. ' '273 Although noting that an agency's

treatment of documents for preservation purposes "may provide some
guidance to a court," the court of appeals warned that "an agency should
ment, reliance or use is irrelevant." Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186. The Court, however, also noted that
"[r]eliance or use may well be relevant. . . to the question of whether a record in the possessionof an
agency is an 'agency record.'" Id. at 177 n.7 (emphasis added).
Agency use of a document was also considered relevant in Kissinger, where the Supreme Court
noted the fact that the telephone memoranda "were not used by the Department for any purpose."
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 157 (1980).
268. Bureau of Nat'lAffairs, 742 F.2d at 1491.
269. Id. at 1492-93 (citing Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 157).
The Court of Appeals held that in order to be subject to the FOIA, personal papers must not
merely "relate to" the employee's work, but must be relied upon by the employee in the performance
of official duties. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1493. See Wolfe v. Department of Health &
Human Servs., 711 F.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (applying disjunctive test of possession or
control). One important consideration is whether and to what extent the records are used by employees other than their author. Bureau of Nat'lAffairs, 742 F.2d at 1493. The court concluded that
an inquiry is required into (1) the purpose that compelled the creation of the document, (2) the
actual use of the document, and (3) the extent to which the creator of the document and other
employees acting within the scope of their employment relied upon the document in carrying out
agency business. Id.
270. Eg., Federal Records Act of 1950, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2909 (1982).
271. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
272. Id. at 183 n.14.
273. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1493; see also Forsham, at 183-84 (although records
statutes may support non-agency record status, the definitions in these statutes "are not dispositive
of the proper interpretation of congressional use of the word in FOIA").
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not be able to alter its disposal regulations to avoid the requirements of
FOIA.,'

274

Applying this analysis to the three categories of disputed records in
Bureau of NationalAffairs and EnvironmentalDefense Fund, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the documents in all
three categories-appointment calendars, telephone message memoranda, and daily agendas-(1) were generated by the agencies; 275 (2)
were not placed in agency files; and (3) were "non-record materials" subject to disposal at the discretion of agency employees under the records
management statutes. 276 Thus, although the agencies could have exercised institutional control over the documents under the relevant statutes
and regulations, they had not in fact done so. 2 77 The court therefore
reasoned that the "agency records" issue must turn on how the documents were used within the agency. 278 This "use" analysis led the court
to conclude that except for the daily agendas, which were used in conducting agency-rather than purely personal-business, the appointment
materials were not "agency records. '2 79 The court noted that a different
conclusion might have been warranted "if the agencies had exercised any
control over the materials or if the documents had been created solely for
the purpose of conducting official agency business. ' 28 0
274. Bureau of Nat'! Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1493. The court conceded the truth of the government's observation that "so long as the records disposal regulations permit destruction of 'nonrecord materials' at the discretion of an agency or agency employee, documents will be available
under FOIA solely based on whether an individual has chosen to keep those documents." Id. at
1495.
275. That is, they were prepared on government time, at government expense, and with government materials, and they were in some cases maintained by officials' secretaries as part of their
official duties. Bureau of Nat Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1494-95.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3315 (1982) and GSA General Records Schedule 23 (1982)).
278. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 742 F.2d at 1495.
279. Id. at 1495-96.
280. Id. at 1496. The court analyzed each type of document separately. The telephone message
slips were not agency records because they contained no substantive information, were used only by
the official receiving the call, and, in many cases, segregation of personal and business calls was
impossible. The daily agendas were declared agency records because they were created for the express purpose of facilitating the daily activities of the Antitrust Division; although they reflected
personal as well as business appointments, they were circulated to the staff for a business purpose.
In this instance, the court held that it was possible to segregate the personal materials before disclosure. Id. at 1495.
The appointment calendars presented a closer question. They were intended to aid the officials
by organizing both their business and personal activities. In some instances, the staff had access to
them. Nonetheless, they were found not to be agency records because (1) they were not distributed
to other employees, and (2) they were created for the personal convenience of the individual officials,
not for an official agency purpose. Id. at 1495-96.
The court considered this decision consistent with its prior decision in Wolfe v. Department of
Health & Human Servs., 711 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Wolfe addressed the question
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Exemption 3 and the Standard of Review for Nondisclosure Under
Internal Revenue Code Section 6103.

Exemption 3 of the FOIA exempts from mandatory disclosure any
information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," as long

as such statute meets the requirements set forth in the exemption. 281 Attempts to invoke this provision frequently raise the question of which
statutes are incorporated in exemption 3282 and, when the procedural requirements of such an exempting statute differ from those of the FOIA,

which requirements control.
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code2 83 has been a source of
frequent litigation over the latter issue. Several provisions of this section
allow the IRS to withhold taxpayer return information, even when the
taxpayer himself is requesting disclosure, if the IRS determines that dis-

closure would

"seriously

impair federal tax administration.

2' 84

Although it appears well-settled that section 6103 qualifies as an exemption 3 statute,2 8 5 a long-standing split of authority exists as to whether
Congress intended section 6103 to operate independently of the procedural requirements of the FOIA.2 86 The resolution of this dilemma affects the standard of review of IRS nondisclosure decisions. If Congress
intended the disclosure of tax return information to be governed excluwhether a report prepared by President-elect Reagan's transition team concerning the Department
of Health and Human Services was an "agency record." Although in Wolfe the Court focused
primarily on the agency's control and possession of the requested document, it also inquired into the
agency's use of the document. Id.
281. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982). The exemption reads, in pertinent part:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this
title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the
public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld
282. For example, Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated
and remanded, 105 S.Ct. 413 (1984) and Povenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799,.
on reh'g, 722 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 105 S.Ct. 413 (1984), both raised the
issue whether the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982) is an exemption 3 statute under the FOIA.
That issue was rendered moot by the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. 98-477,
§ 2 (c), 98 Stat. 2209, 2211-12 (1984), which declared that the Privacy Act is not an exempting
statute under the FOIA. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
283. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982).
284. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103 (b)(2), (c), (e)(7) (1982).
285. See, e.g., Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 526-28 (11th Cir. 1983); White v. IRS, 707 F.2d 897,
900-01 (6th Cir. 1983); Willamette Indus. v. IRS, 689 F.2d 865, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1982), cerL denied,
460 U.S. 1052 (1983); Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 797 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Breuhaus v. IRS, 609
F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 840 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 842 (1979); Freuhauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574, 578 n.6 (6th Cir. 1977); Mason v. Calloway,
554 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
286. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
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sively by the provisions of section 6103, then a nondisclosure decision by
the IRS would not be subject to judicial examination of the agency's ad-

herence to the procedural requirements or the policy objectives of the
FOIA. 287 In that case, judicial review of the agency's decision would be
limited to determining whether the agency's conclusion that disclosure

would "seriously impair" tax administration was "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'288 In
contrast, the FOIA requires the district court to conduct de novo review
of the agency's decision. 289 The court may require the agency to segregate exempt material, disclose the remainder, and supply an index providing detailed justification for each item withheld. 290 In addition, the
29
FOIA places the burden on the agency to justify nondisclosure. 1
Several courts have ruled that the FOIA provides the sole standard
of review when section 6103 is invoked under exemption 3.292 Others
adhere to the view, first advanced by a district court in Zale Corp. v.
294
IRS,2 93 that section 6103 preempts the more stringent FOIA standard.

In 1984, courts of appeals in both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits
rejected Zale and applied the de novo standard of review. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Linsteadt v. IRS 295 simply reaffirmed its pre-Zale commitment to this standard. 296 In Long v. IRS 2 9 7 however, the Ninth
I

287. Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 526 (11th Cir. 1983); King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir.
1982).
288. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (1982).
289. The FOIA provides that the district court "shall determine the matter de novo, and may
examine the contents of such agency records. . . to determine whether such records or any part
thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
290. Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Vaughn v.
Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). For a discussion of
the Vaughn index, see supra note 263.
291. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
292. See, e.g., Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 526-28 (11th Cir. 1983); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589
F.2d 827, 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979); Britt v. IRS, 547 F. Supp. 808, 809-13
(D.D.C. 1982).
293. 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979).
294. See, e.g., King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1982); Church of Scientology v. IRS,
569 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (D.D.C. 1983); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (N.D. Ind. 1982),
a.f'd, 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984); Heinsohn v. IRS, 553 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D. Tenn. 1982);
Watson v. IRS, 538 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Chermack v. IRS, Civ. Action No. CA3-800164-C (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1981); Ashton v. Krutz, Civ. Action No. 78-822 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1981);
Hulsey v. IRS, 497 F. Supp. 617, 618 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004, 1004-05
(N.D. Ill.
1980); see also White v. IRS, 707 F.2d 897, 900 (6th Cir. 1983) (court indicates inclination
to accept the Zale rationale). The District of Columbia Circuit has not yet stated its position on
Zale. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 703 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1982), vacated, 464 U.S. 979 (1983).
295. 729 F.2d 998, 1001-03 (5th Cir. 1984).
296. See Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
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Circuit reached the issue for the first time. It rejected not only Zale's
section 6103 preemption argument, 298 but also a separate preemption argument based specifically on the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act

(ERTA) amendment to section 6103.299
The district court in Long had held that the proper scope of a
court's de novo review where section 6103 was invoked under exemption
3 was to ascertain whether (1) the requested material fell within the category of materials protected by that provision, and (2) the agency had in
fact made the determination required by the statute-that disclosure

would seriously impair federal tax administration. 3°° In reversing, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the

proper standard of review, where section 6103 is invoked under exemption 3, is the FOIA requirement that the reviewing court make an independent determination on the question of harm. 30 1 The Long court
expressly rejected Zale on the ground that "neither section 6103 nor its
legislative history contains any language indicating that section 6103
should operate independently of FOIA. ' ' 30 2 It concluded that the re297. 742 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1984).
298. Id. at 1178.
299. Id. The plaintiffs in Long were taxpayers seeking to compel the IRS to disclose computer
tapes and other data used by the agency to determine standards for the selection of returns for
auditing. Id. at 1175. The IRS refused, citing section 6103(b)(2) and, in particular, the language
added to that section by the ERTA amendment. Id. at 1175-76. The ERTA amendment provides:
Nothing in the preceding sentence, nor in any other provision of law, shall be construed to
require disclosure of standards used or to be used for the selection of returns for examination, or data used or to be used for determining such standards, if the Secretary determines
that such disclosure will seriously impair assessment, collection, or enforcement under the
internal revenue laws.
5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982). The IRS contended that the phrase "any other provision of law"
referred to the FOIA and that even if other provisions of section 6103 do not preempt the FOIA's
procedural standards, the ERTA amendment does. Long, 742 F.2d at 1178.
300. Long v. IRS, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9487, at 84,780 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 1982). The
district court first held that the ERTA amendment qualified as an exemption 3 statute and the
auditing data requested by the plaintiffs clearly fell within the category of materials the ERTA provision was intended to protect. Id. It then cited Zale for the proposition that, in the context of a
FOIA request for tax return information, section 6103 should provide the "sole standard governing
release of return information," id. at 84,781 (quoting Zale, 481 F. Supp. at 490), and concluded that
if Zale provided the applicable standard then "to the extent any inconsistdncy exists between the
provisions of the FOIA and those of Section 6103, the confidentiality provision of Section 6103
should prevail." Id.
301. Long, 742 F.2d at 1182. The court stated: "We. . .reject the argument that Congress has
committed the determination of impairment to agency discretion so that review is unavailable. We
likewise reject the argument that the Commissioner's determination of impairment is subject to review only to determine whether it is 'arbitrary and capricious.'" Id. at 1181. Although such review
is sufficient to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, 706 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983),
the court of appeals ruled that the APA standard does not govern review of FOIA requests. Long,
742 F.2d at 1181.
302. Id. at 1177. The court compared the language and legislative history of section 6103 with
that of section 6110, which was added to the tax code at the same time that § 6103 was amended to
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viewing court "must satisfy itself, on the basis of detailed and nonconclusory affidavits, that the [IRS] Commissioner is correct in his belief
that disclosure. . . would pose a substantial risk of impairing the collection, assessment, or enforcement of the tax laws," with the agency bear30 3
ing the burden of proof.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the government's argument that
the ERTA amendment 3°4 prohibits application of the FOIA standard of
judicial review to cases involving requests for disclosure of audit-related

data. 30 5 "Although FOIA surely is 'any other provision of law,' the only
real effect of placing section 6103 within FOIA is procedural. .

.

. In-

clusion does not have the effect of requiring disclosure so long as the
amendment satisfies the criteria of exemption 3 and the [requested] data

fall within its ambit. '' 30 6 Review under an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, the court concluded, would broaden the agency's discretionary
its present form, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976). The court
found it significant that Congress specified that the procedures of FOIA would be preempted by
section 6110, 26 U.S.C. § 6110(1) (1982), and found Congress's failure to do likewise in amending
section 6103 "highly persuasive of an intent not to preempt the procedural provisions of FOIA as to
requests under section 6103." Long, 742 F.2d at 1178.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). Mink involved a nondisclosure decision under exemption 1 of the FOIA; at that time exemption I reached
matters "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of the national
defense or foreign policy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970). Justice Stewart's concurrence in Mink defined the scope of a district court's de novo review under exemption 3 as consisting merely of an
inquiry into the factual existence of a statute specifically exempting the sought-after material from
disclosure: "[T]he only 'matter' to be determined de novo under § 552(b)(1) is whether in fact the
President has required by Executive Order that the documents in question are to be kept secret ...
[I]n enacting § 552(b)(1) Congress chose, instead, to decree blind acceptance of Executive fiat."
Mink, 410 U.S. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring). The district court in Long had relied on Stewart's
language when it limited the scope of de novo review to ascertaining the factual existence of an
exempting statute and of a determination that the statute was applicable. Long, 742 F.2d at 1180.
In 1974, however, Congress amended the FOIA for the express purpose of overturning Mink.
See S. REP. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6267. The amendment modified exemption 1 to exempt only those matters (1) specifically authorized to be kept secret, and (2) "in fact properly classified" as such. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982 &
Supp. I 1983). The same amendment placed the burden on the agency to "sustain its action" in de
novo review, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1, 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). Similarly, in 1976, Congress amended exemption 3-to achieve the exemption's present wording-out of concern that the old statute's delegation of discretion gave an agency
"carte blanche to withhold any information [it] pleases." H.R. REP. No. 880, pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 23, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2205. The court of appeals in
Long found the legislative response to Mink, combined with the legislative history of the amendment
to exemption 3, strongly indicative of Congress's intent that the FOIA court conduct an independent
assessment of agency decisions. Long, 742 F.2d at 1180-81.
303. Long, 742 F.2d at 1183. The court noted, however, that on review special deference could
properly be accorded the agency's determination. Id. at 1182-83.
304. For the text of the amendment, see supra note 299.
305. Long, 742 F.2d at 1178.
306. Id.
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powers and thereby increase the risk of nondisclosure decisions that con30 7
travene the intent of Congress.
E. In Camera Review and Trial Court Discretion Under Exemption 5.
The agency records sought by a FOIA plaintiff often consist of nonexempt factual information intertwined with exempt material. In response to such cases, Congress in 1974 amended the FOIA to provide
that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided
. . . after deletion of the portions which are exempt. ' 30 8 Another
change added by the same legislation gave the district courts discretion
to conduct in camera inspections of the disputed materials. 30 9 In 1984,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
was asked in Centerfor Auto Safety v. EPA3 10 to determine under what
circumstances a district court must conduct an in camera review of part
of the requested documents to verify an agency's claim that factual and
deliberative material is "inextricably intertwined." ' 311 Specifically, the
court was asked to adopt a "limited per se rule" requiringthe trial court
to conduct in camera review of any documents claimed exempt under
exemption 5 of the FOIA. 3 12 Although the court recognized "persuasive
policy reasons to adopt a per se rule, '31 3 it declined to articulate a standard for mandatory in camera review, stating that "such a per se rule
would contravene the clear grant by Congress of broad discretion to trial
'31 4
judges in this matter.
Center for Auto Safety involved a request by a nonprofit consumer
organization for documents relevant to an EPA decision allowing General Motors to offset the illegal emission levels of its 1979 cars by lowering those of its 1982 and 1983 models. 3 15 The EPA withheld the
requested materials, arguing that the materials were "intra-agency communications and records of settlement negotiations which reflect EPA's
307. Id. at 1182.
308. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). This amendment incorporated the longstanding
rule of the District of Columbia Circuit that an agency must disclose non-exempt factual information unless it is inextricably intertwined with exempt material. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
309. "ITIhe court may examine the contents of such agency records in camera. . .. . 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
310. 731 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
311. Id. at 17.
312. Id. For the text of exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1982), see supra text accompanying
note 164.
313. Centerfor Auto Safety, 731 F.2d at 22.
314. Id. at 17.
315. Id. at 17-18.
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deliberative process" and were thus exempt under exemption

5.316

In

support of its motion for summary judgment, the EPA submitted both a
3 17
Vaughn index and an affidavit from the appropriate agency official.
The district court found that this "detailed explanatory material" pro-

vided sufficient basis for granting the agency's motion, and denied the
3 18
Center's request for an in camera review.

In upholding the district court's decision, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Center's contention that the trial
court should have conducted an in camera inspection to determine

whether any factual material was "reasonably segregable" from the withheld documents,

319

and pointed out that the language of the FOIA au-

thorizing in camera review is permissive rather than mandatory. 320 The
court concluded that, in the absence of Congressional action to the contrary, a reviewing court is obligated to respect the FOIA's "clear grant of
32 1
discretion" to the trial court.

316. Id. at 18. The EPA contended that it had disclosed all segregable factual material. Id.
317. Id. For a discussion of the Vaughn index, see supra note 263.
318. Centerfor Auto Safety, 731 F.2d at 18.
319. Id. at 20.
320. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982) ("may examine the contents of such agency records
in camera"). The court also noted that the legislative history of the 1974 amendment "clearly reflects the view that in camera reviews were to be a 'secondary tool of FOIA enforcement.'" Center
for Auto Safety, 731 F.2d at 20 (citing Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir.
1983)). The court quoted the 1974 Conference Report: "While in camera examinations need not be
automatic, in many situations it will plainly be necessary and appropriate." Centerfor Auto Safety,
731 F.2d at 20 (quoting S. REp. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267, 6287-88). Similarly, the House Report comments that FOIA
"permit[s] such in camera inspection at the discretion of the Court." Centerfor Auto Safety, 731
F.2d at 20 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974)).
The court of appeals also cited the Supreme Court's language in NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co.: "The in camera review provision [of the FOIA] is discretionary by its terms, and is
designed to be invoked when the issue before the District Court could not be otherwise resolved; it
thus does not mandate that the documents be individually examined in every case." CenterforAuto
Safety, 731 F.2d at 21 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978)),
See also Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding from legislative history of 1974
and 1976 amendments that Congress intended the grant of broad discretion to trial judge); Ray v.
Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Congress did not specify proper scope of in camera
inspection).
321. Centerfor Auto Safety, 731 F.2d at 22. The court of appeals expressed some reservations,
however, noting that certain policy considerations favor the adoption of a per se rule for exemption 5
cases. In particular, it acknowledged the validity of the Center's claim that such cases "pose unique
problems of determining whether segregable factual portions exist within a document, and. . .without in camera review, a district court is unable to test the accuracy of agency affidavits." Id. at 21.
The court found these policy concerns outweighed, however, by "the fundamental principle of saving judicial resources," id., and noted the precedential danger of the requested rule:
The "segregability" requirement applies to all documents and all exemptions in the FOIA.
If this Court were to adopt the per se rule suggested by appellant, we would be hard
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F. Discovery by a FOIA Defendant.
A novel issue in FOIA litigation reached the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in 1984 in Weisberg v. Webster.322 The
court was asked to determine whether a district court may order a FOIA
plaintiff to respond to the government's discovery requests, and, if so,
whether it may properly dismiss the complaint 323 if the plaintiff refuses
to comply. 324 By answering both questions in the affirmative, the Weisberg decision has the potential to substantially influence the FOIA litigation procedure in the future.
The plaintiff in Weisberg filed his FOIA suit in 1978, seeking information from the FBI concerning the assassinations of President John F.
Kennedy and Martin Luther King. 325 The FBI released over two hundred thousand pages of documents and notified the plaintiff that it would
not release more without a court order. 326 When the plaintiff asserted
that information in his possession demonstrated the inadequacy of the
FBI's search, the agency sought discovery from him of "each and every
fact" and "each and every document" upon which he based his claim of
inadequacy. 327 The district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a protective order excusing him from responding to the government's interrogatories. 328 When the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's
329
order to respond, the court granted the FBI's motion to dismiss.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. It rejected outright the
plaintiff's argument that allowing discovery of information held by FOIA
plaintiffs is inconsistent with the FOIA's policy of placing the burden of
pressed not to extend the rule in future cases to the other exemptions. This result would be
contrary to the intent of Congress.
Id.
322. 749 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
323. The dismissal sanction for failing to comply with a court order compelling response is authorized under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
324. Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 867.
325. Id. at 865.
326. Id. at 866. The plaintiff refused the FBI's offer to produce a random sample of the withheld
documents in order to judge validity of their exemption claims. Id.
327. Id. On the strength of the plaintiff's assertions, the district court denied the FBI's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of the adequacy of the search.
328. Id. The plaintiff's motion was based on three arguments: (1) there was no need for an
agency to seek discovery from a FOIA plaintiff on search issues because the relevant information is
in the agency's possession; (2) discovery in this instance was particularly burdensome to the plaintiff
due to his illness; and (3) in the course of his administrative appeals, the plaintiff had already pro-

vided most of the information sought. Id.
329. Id. at 867. The district court assessed expenses and attorney fees against the plaintiff and
his counsel, pursuant to Rules 37(a)(4) and 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at
866-67.
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proof on the government, 330 and found that neither the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure nor the language or policy of the FOIA provided for
such an exemption. 33 1 The court also found it "possible that the individual members of the agency involved are not as astute or as knowledgeable
as to what they have in their files as the plaintiff-requester"; thus, it held,
it was appropriate to permit the government to "draw on that expertise"
332
in order to meet more efficiently its burden of proof.

Discovery by a FOIA defendant has the potential to discourage
FOIA suits by increasing the litigation burdens that the FOIA was intended to alleviate.3 33 Although the Weisberg court predicted that defense discovery in FOIA cases would be limited in practice, it declined to
articulate a special policy to govern such cases. 334 Furthermore, in upholding the district court's dismissal sanction, the court of appeals failed

to address the policy arguments for distinguishing FOIA plaintiffs from
other civil litigants who refuse to comply with court orders compelling

discovery. In the absence of special protection for FOIA plaintiffs, the
government's exercise of this prerogative could frustrate the FOIA's un330. "[T]he burden of proof in most instances has nothing to do with the propriety of one side or
the other engaging in discovery. The proper inquiry is whether anything in the FOIA or the statutes
and cases governing discovery point to an exemption from discovery for FOIA plaintiffs." Id at
867.
331. Id. at 867-68 & nn.17-22 (citing Martin v. Neuschel, 396 F.2d 759, 760 (3d Cir. 1968)
(FOIA defendants are given "the right to. . . have the merits of the controversy decided in regular
course," because "the government and its officers, as well as private citizens, are entitled to due and
regular process in the pleading, hearing and disposition of litigated claims.")). The Weisberg court
ruled that the underlying policy of the FOIA presents no obstacle to defense discovery:
The government should be able to use the discovery rules in FOIA suits like any other
litigant, to uncover facts which enable it to meet its burden of proving either the adequacy
of its search or the exempt status of requested documents. The government may also properly desire to use discovery in FOIA suits "as a device. . . to narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties."
Id. at 868 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).
332. Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 868-69. The court noted that the plaintiff had devoted twenty years
to the subject matter of his request. In addition, the court indicated that because the plaintiff had
defeated the FBI's motion for summary judgment by asserting that information in his possession
demonstrated the inadequacy of its search, "fairness required that the agency be allowed access" to
those materials. Id. at 868.
333. See Werner-Continental, Inc. v. Farkas, 478 F. Supp. 815, 816 (S.D. Ohio), affid, 661 F.2d
935 (6th Cir. 1981) (policy of FOIA is "to enable citizens to pursue their statutory rights by eliminating administrative barriers that could only be hurdled through expensive litigation").
334. The court stated:
Discovery must be relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, and in the
usual FOIA case, the government will be in possession of all such evidence. For that
reason, in the context of FOIA litigation courts will guard against the use of discovery as
an instrument of abuse, just as they would in any other case. This is not to say that FOIA
cases merit special protection against discovery abuse, but only that judges, as a practical
matter, will naturally take note of the posture of the usual FOIA case, in the same way that
they would take note of the posture of any case.
Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 868 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
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derlying purpose of facilitating disclosure by persuading some plaintiffs
to accept a dismissal sanction-or perhaps to forego litigation en-

tirely 335-rather

than face the possibility that their personal records

might have to be opened for government inspection.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of the Durenburger bill dealing with the national
security exemption, agency and Congressional activity in 1984 continued
the general trend toward curtailment of access to agency information.
The enactment in 1984 of the National Security Act Amendments significantly increased the CIA's discretion to withhold requested materials,
although at the same time it eliminated one disputed ground for agency
nondisclosure by declaring that the Privacy Act is not an exemption 3
statute. Legislation was also proposed to limit access to certain information reported by business entities, and to narrow the scope of the national
security exemption. Also proposed but not enacted was a substantial reform bill that would have effected major changes in the FOIA's procedural provisions and broadened the scope of the law enforcement
exemptions.
Administrative actions taken in 1984 effected some degree of clarification of the law but did so at the expense of open access. The DOJ
issued guidelines making access to its records more expensive; both the
DOJ and the CPSC amended their guidelines to give submitters of information a greater opportunity to restrict subsequent disclosures.
There was an absence of substantial Supreme Court activity concerning the FOIA in 1984, and the Court's single decision on the incorporation of civil discovery privileges in exemption 5 offers only limited
guidance to courts and potential litigants.
The circuit courts of appeals, however, were sharply divided on a
number of FOIA issues. The circuit courts' conflicting approaches took
on special significance in two areas: the scope of the confidentiality requirement of exemption 7(D), and the distinguishing of agency records
from other records physically possessed by agencies. It would not be
surprising if, in light of Environmental Defense Fund and the government's new arguments in Crooker, future cases might give rise to conflicts in applying the exemption for predecisional memoranda as well.
On one issue, however, the circuits seemed to have drawn closer to accord; with respect to the proper standard of review in exemption 3 cases,
335. The additional prospect of the assessment of expenses and attorney fees in conjunction with
the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim could further inhibit the pursuit of FOIA claims. See supranote
329.

792

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:742

it appears unlikely, in view of the decisions in Linsteadt and Long, that
the minority position of Zale will receive further support.
Finally, two otherwise unrelated decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit-one allowing discovery by a FOIA defendant, another upholding a trial court's discretion to refuse in camera review-both
illustrated the judicial reluctance to offer procedural advantages to FOIA
plaintiffs beyond those clearly mandated by Congress.
Lisa A. Krupicka and Mary E. LaFrance

